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Cloud services are flourishing recently, both among computer users and business 
enterprises. They deliver remote, on-demand, convenient services for data storage, access 
and processing. While embracing the benefits brought by various cloud services, the 
consumers are faced with data disclosure, privacy leaks and malicious attacks. Therefore, 
it is important to use strong access control policies to maintain the security and 
confidentiality of the data stored in the cloud.  
This thesis studies the performance of three existing security schemes proposed for cloud 
data access control on the basis of trust and reputation. We implement the three schemes 
and conduct computation complexity analysis, security analysis and performance 
evaluation. This thesis introduces the implementation of a number of cryptographic 
algorithms applied in the above data access control schemes, including Proxy Re-
encryption (PRE) and Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE), 
reputation generation and secure data transmission over Secure Socket Layer (SSL). We 
summarize the evaluation results and compare the performances in the aspects of 
computation and communication costs, flexibility, scalability and feasibility of practical 
usage. Pros and cons, as well as suitable application scenarios of the three schemes are 
further discussed. 
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Chapter 1    Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Cloud computing, as an emerging computing paradigm, is blooming in both academia and 
industry. It is defined by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as 
a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management 
efforts [1]. Cloud computing enables various cloud services to provide infrastructure, 
platform and software for ubiquitous communications and data access. For example, some 
popular cloud services, such as Google Drive, iCloud and Dropbox, have freed us from 
hardware restraints and ensured that the data we need are available at any time and in any 
place. However, while embracing the services and benefits brought by cloud computing, we 
are also facing the problems of data disclosure, privacy leaks and malicious attacks.  
Since cloud services, especially cloud storage and data management, are gaining special 
attention from computer users and business enterprises, data security is becoming a major 
hurdle to widespread adoption of cloud technologies. For example, user’s personal data were 
reported to be leaked from Google and Apple applications. And two data breaches took place 
at Oregon Health and Science University due to inappropriate handling and storage of 
unencrypted patient medical records in the cloud. Currently, access control in the cloud 
environment is typically provided by techniques such as VLANs and firewalls, which are 
originally designed to support enterprise IT systems [2]. These techniques are not suitable for 
the multi-tenant and dynamic nature of cloud, thus they could lead to major data breaches.  
In order to meet the security and privacy requirements for data access control in cloud 
services, a number of solutions have been proposed, such as authorization [3][4], trust and 
reputation management [5][6][7][8], and data encryption [9][10][11][12][13][14]. Among 
these techniques, data encryption is considered a secure way to keep data confidentiality, 
because it depends less on the trust of cloud servers than other solutions. In addition, before 
the access control schemes are applied in practical systems, they should be implemented and 
evaluated with regard to meeting the requirements on security, flexibility, and computational 
efficiency. Based on the three existing security schemes proposed for cloud data access 
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control on the basis of trust and reputation [5], we conduct performance evaluation based on 
complexity analysis, security analysis and scheme implementation in order to provide their 
pros and cons regarding feasibility of practical usage.  
1.2 Objectives of the thesis 
The objective of this thesis is to implement and evaluate three different schemes for secure 
data access control in cloud computing. Through the evaluation and comparison, we discuss 
the pros and cons of each scheme for practical usage. Concretely, we aim to fulfill the 
following research tasks in order to achieve the objectives of the thesis: 
Scheme implementation: This thesis work firstly intends to implement the three proposed 
scheme in terms of data access control in cloud computing. The scheme implementation 
consists of developing a number of cryptographic algorithms, reputation evaluation 
algorithms, trust level (TL) assessment algorithms, and secure communications. All the main 
functionalities of the above algorithms and protocols can be integrated to form a complete 
scheme and system implementation, as well as being called separately to provide 
independent operations related to the schemes. 
Performance test: The performance of the proposed schemes is tested and analyzed under a 
certain environment based on the implantation of the above algorithms, and the test results 
are reported in details. The test results are deeply analyzed regarding different entities and 
the system as a whole. 
Performance analysis, evaluation and comparison: Upon the implementation and 
performance test, computational complexity, data confidentiality, scalability and flexibility 
are further analyzed and compared.  
Further discussion: Upon the implementations and performance evaluation, we further 
provide the pros and cons of the three access control schemes, as well as discuss their use 
scenarios. Additionally, in order to make the performance evaluation and comparison more 
thorough, we hope to come up with additional ideas and discussions towards further 
improvement and optimization. 
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1.3 Thesis structure 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives a review of related work of trust and 
reputation management, data access control methods and privacy issues in cloud computing. 
Chapter 3 introduces the cryptographic basics, and the design of three schemes for data 
access control in cloud computing based on trust and reputation. Chapter 4 describes the 
design of system implementation, which includes the implementation of Proxy Re-
Encryption (PRE), Ciphertext Policy-Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE), secure 
transmission, and reputation/trust evaluation. Chapter 5 reports the results of performance 
evaluation and comparison, and further discusses the pros and cons of the three data access 
control schemes. Finally, the conclusions of the whole thesis with a proposal of future work 
are given in the last chapter.  
1.4 Contributions 
The contributions of the thesis can be summarized as follows: 
1) Independently implemented three cloud data access control schemes based on the trust 
and reputation; 
2) Conducted performance evaluation of the three schemes based on implementation, with 
regard to computation and communication cost, flexibility, scalability and feasibility of 
practical usage. Comparison was conducted among the three schemes and with other 
existing related schemes; 
3) Further discussed the pros and cons of the three schemes based on performance 
comparison. 
While writing this thesis, I co-authored several conference and journal papers in the subject 
of this thesis. My contributions for those publications enabled the scheme implementations 
and evaluations, which are relevant to this thesis. The publications and detailed contributions 
are presented in Appendix.  
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Chapter 2    Related Work 
This chapter gives a brief introduction to several solutions for data access control, and 
surveys the methods of privacy preserving in cloud computing.  
2.1 Trust and reputation management in cloud computing 
Trust and reputation are mentioned in many literature sources, and they usually have no 
unique definitions because of their appearance in different research backgrounds. For 
instance, Hussain provided an overview on trust and reputation definitions, and indicated that 
the current notions of trust and reputation need to be further formally defined [15]. Dasgupta 
defined trust as “the expectation of one person about the actions of others that affects the first 
person’s choice, when an action must be taken before the actions of others are known” [16]. 
Rahman defined reputation as “an expectation about an agent’s behavior based on 
information or observations of its past behavior” [17]. As the research of trust and reputation 
grows fast in both theoretical foundations and real-world deployment, a number of e-
commerce and cloud service companies apply them in ranking their products and suppliers, 
as well as building their recommendation systems. In cloud computing, trust and reputation 
are capitalized on designing mechanisms for data access control or recommendation systems, 
and are regarded as effective incentives to form a healthy and trustworthy network of 
participants who may have no prior knowledge of each other. 
2.1.1 Trust management 
Trust management is playing a critical role in increasing reliability, usability and security in 
cloud computing. Sato proposed a trust management model by dividing the model into two 
layers, namely the internal trust layer and contracted trust layer [18]. The internal trust layer 
is based on the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), which is an international standard for a 
secure cryptoprocessor. It handles strict security operations, such as key generation, key 
management and private data modification. The contracted trust layer is defined as the trust 
determined by certain contracts between service providers and users. A contract defines the 
trust and security level of a service provider, and the reliance between the provider and its 
users. Although there can be different trust levels in the negotiation on a contract, this model 
does not give specific factors for evaluating the trust levels. And it requires resigning the 
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contract whenever there is a service demand or security requirement update. Yao proposed 
an accountability-based system to achieve Trustworthy Service Oriented Architecture 
(TSOA) [19]. The trust and accountability management also depends on predefined and 
mutually agreed policies, called Service Level Agreement (SLA). It monitors each 
participant’s behavior, and determines which participant is accountable according to the SLA. 
Pawar proposed a trust model to support the trustworthiness verification of cloud 
infrastructure providers [20]. The trust levels are calculated based on a feedback model in 
terms of trust, distrust and uncertainty. This approach also depends on a predefined SLA. 
Prajapati proposed a trust management model for Software as a service (SaaS) in cloud 
environment [21]. In this model, trust is evaluated through Trust which indicates direct 
relations between participants, and Recommended Trust which is based on recommendations 
from other participants. However, this model assumes that all the nodes are honest, and is not 
resilient to malicious feedback or attacks. Habib proposed a multi-faceted Trust Management 
(TM) system to help users choose trustworthy cloud service providers [22]. The system 
evaluates trust levels through comprehensive attributes of Quality of Service (QoS), such as 
security, compliance, availability and response time. The TM system is centralized by 
registering all the cloud service providers in the Registration Manager (RM), and provides a 
Trust Manager (TMg) to allow service users to specify their requirements and feedback.  
Yan proposed a Trust assessment model which enables both trust assessment between CSPs 
and users to help users choose trustworthy CSPs, and also the trust assessment between users 
to allow access right delegation [23]. This Trust assessment model is designed for cloud 
computing and mobile social networks. It takes mobile services (e.g., mobile calls, instant 
messages, pervasive interactions, etc.), weight parameters, priority levels and a punishment 
factor into account for participant’s trust level assessment. 
Table I provides the comparison of Trust management models proposed in [23][18][22], 
according to the following properties.  
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Table I Comparison of trust management model 
 Sato [18] Habib 
[22] 
Yan [23] 
Factors for trust assessment 
Not 
specified 
QoS 
Weight parameter; 
Priority level; 
Punishment factor 
Enable trust assessment 
between CSPs and users 
√ √ √ 
Enable trust assessment between 
users 
- - √ 
Trust management through policy √ - - 
Trust management through 
feedback 
- √ √ 
Enable attack resistance - √ - 
Factors for trust assessment: Factors for trust assessment determine what properties and 
issues should be considered in trust evaluation and management. The factors depend on the 
application context or the design purposes. For example, Habib chooses QoS, and Yan 
selects performance and weight of behavior in mobile social network as evaluation 
parameters. 
Enable trust assessment between CSPs and Users: It determines the purpose of Trust 
management system. Enabling trust assessment between CSPs and users is designed to help 
users choose trustworthy CSPs, and encourage CSPs to have better performance. 
Enable trust assessment between users: It is designed for enabling data access right 
delegation between cloud service users. 
Trust management through policy/feedback: This determines the technique used for trust 
assessment and management. For example, Sato monitors and manages the trust levels by 
signing contracts, while Habib evaluates and manages trust levels through feedback and 
recommendations. 
Enable attack resistance: It considers if a trust management scheme is resistant to 
malicious attacks, such as malicious rating, self-promoting, and collusive behaviors. 
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2.1.2 Reputation management 
While trust management plays an important role in guaranteeing meaningful services and 
interactions in cloud computing, reputation provides the basis of evaluating and quantifying 
trust levels. Habib identified a set of important parameters required to support reputation 
evaluation, including system performance (e.g., latency, bandwidth, availability, reliability, 
etc.), and security measures (e.g., physical security support, network security support, key 
management, etc.) [24]. Bradai proposed a reputation-based architecture to help users choose 
trustworthy peers in the cloud environment [25]. This architecture consists of three models, 
in which the first model evaluates the reputation given by the users, and the other two refine 
the reputation values to detect malicious ratings. Koneru proposed a reputation management 
system based on user recommendations [26]. Muralidharan proposed a novel reputation 
management system for volunteer clouds, in which computer owners can donate their 
computing resources [27]. This system assesses each participant’s reputation according to the 
performance of service time, crash time, and correctness of service results. Although the 
three factors are important for service and reputation evaluation, the network status can 
easily affect different aspects of the performance. Therefore, it decreases the objectivity of a 
participant’s reputation. Zhu proposed an authenticated reputation and trust management 
system for cloud and sensor networks [28]. The trust and reputation are calculated according 
to the performance and feedback of data processing, data privacy and data transmission. 
However, the system still depends on predefined service level agreement (SLA) and privacy 
level agreement (PLA). 
Besides different factors chosen for reputation evaluation and management in various 
application contexts, unfair ratings and malicious attacks are also important issues which 
affect the performance and efficiency of a reputation management system. Yan proposed a 
centralized reputation management system for data access control in cloud computing [29]. It 
employs a Reputation Center (RC) as a trusted third party to manage and verify users’ 
reputations. Moreover, it applies a punishment agreement to encourage good performances 
and honest voting. Wu proposed a reputation revision method which applies a novel filter to 
recognize the unfair ratings [30]. The reputation evaluation is based on the QoS, including 
response time, cost, and reliability, as well as users’ ratings for prior service experience. The 
method applies similarity theory to distinguish abnormal evaluations, and calculates average 
ratings. Wang proposed an accurate and multi-faceted reputation scheme which detects 
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unfair ratings to improve the accuracy of reputation calculation [31]. The scheme firstly 
identifies suspicious users whose ratings deviate from others significantly, and then identifies 
collusive users through similarity clustering. After removing those malicious users and unfair 
ratings, it calculates the overall reputation value. 
2.2 Role-Based Access Control in cloud computing 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) was firstly proposed by Ferraiolo and Kuhn in [32]. The 
basic principle of RBAC is separating users and permissions by inserting different roles. 
Users are assigned to some roles based on their job functions and responsibilities. Each role 
has their corresponding operational permissions, and users can only obtain the permissions 
after activating their roles. RBAC simplifies the permission assignment and authorization 
management by grouping permissions according to the roles, as well as separating job duties. 
Moreover, by relating permissions only to roles instead of users, it is more scalable and 
easier to manage permissions in the cloud computing environment where a large amount of 
users are presented, and it is difficult to track each of their identities. However, RBAC 
manages permissions statistically according to predefined roles, without considering some 
dynamic aspects such as time, and service context. Bertino proposed a Temporal Role-Based 
Access Control (TRBAC) to address the periodic permission problems by enabling roles at 
different time intervals [33]. Joshi proposed a general temporal RBAC (GTRBAC) which 
allows a wider range of temporal constraints of role assignments and permission assignments 
by clearly defining a protocol of constraints, including active duration constrains, maximum 
number of activations of a role, and enabling/disabling roles [34]. Besides permission time 
intervals, dynamic service contexts are also considered to improve RBAC. Yu proposed a 
role and task based access control model (RTABC) to refine the permission assignment, by 
adding a task layer between permission sets and roles [35]. A task is a minimum function 
unit of an operation, and an operation process can contain a group of tasks. In RTABC, 
operating permissions are not directly assigned to roles, but tasks. Users can obtain 
permissions of certain tasks by their allocated roles, and the permissions are constrained by 
task state, task weight and time. Barati designed a new semantic role-based access control 
model for cloud computing [36]. The model enables recommendations of tasks which a user 
can possibly require the permissions of.  
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In RBAC [32], there are role hierarchies where senior roles can have permissions of their 
junior roles. However, sometimes it is necessary for a junior role to have a permission in 
order to perform a senior role’s operations. Tang proposed a new RBAC model for cloud 
computing, in which there are two additional roles namely User Role (UR) and Owner Role 
(OR) [37]. Users can get permissions from owners to access some resources in the cloud. Na 
also proposed a role delegation RBAC which allows junior roles to be granted of their senior 
roles’ permissions [38]. Delegation server and delegation protocols are employed in this 
method, in which a delegation server is responsible for the delegation, while the delegation 
protocol describes the delegation process. Lin proposed a scheme for cross-domain access 
control system in cloud computing, which integrates the RBAC with trust management. It 
establishes a set of associations with regard of roles between the local domain and other 
domains [39]. In order to perform various permission constraints and role delegations, 
Gitanjali proposed several policy specifications for RBAC [40]. The policies consist of 
permission delegation, role delegation, and also delegation of the access rights to cloud 
service providers. Moreover, Gitanjali designed the backup and restoration policies in case 
the service crashes and the data is lost. 
2.3 Attribute-Based Encryption for cloud computing 
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) has been recently well studied for data access control in 
cloud computing, because it does not require either the identities of the data requesters or 
their public keys, but only the attributes the requesters own [41]. Sahai and Waters proposed 
the initial ABE which evolved from Identity-Based Encryption [42]. In the initial ABE, an 
identity consists of a set of descriptive attributes. A user can use a private key for an identity 
  to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with an identity  , if and only if   match    over a 
certain threshold that makes it error-tolerant. The initial ABE was further extended to two 
varieties, Key Policy-Attribute Based Encryption (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext Policy-Attribute 
Based Encryption (CP-ABE). Key Policy-Attribute Based Encryption (KP-ABE) was 
proposed by Goyal in 2006 [43]. It is a public key cryptographic scheme built upon bilinear 
map and Linear Secret-Sharing Scheme (LSSS) [44]. In KP-ABE, a ciphertext is associated 
with a set of attributes during the encryption, while a secret key is generated based on an 
access policy, which is an access structure over a set of data attributes. To decrypt the 
ciphertext, the data attributes must satisfy the access structure. Chase proposed a multi-
authority attribute based encryption scheme, which allows multiple authorities to control the 
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data access at the same time [45]. Each of the authorities maintains a set of attributes, and a 
user can only decrypt if the number of attributes he/she possesses is beyond the threshold of 
each authority. Wang proposed a KP-ABE scheme with constant ciphertext size no matter 
how many attributes are embedded [46]. Yan designed a secure personal health record 
system using KP-ABE in a cloud computing environment [47]. Although KP-ABE is 
believed secure for data access control in cloud computing, it comes with high computational 
cost, especially if there is a large number of attributes. Lv proposed an efficient and secure 
KP-ABE scheme for mobile cloud storage by outsourcing the KP-ABE key generation and 
decryption process to a trusted attribute authority [48]. Yu combined the KP-ABE and Proxy 
Re-Encryption (PRE) to achieve fine-grained data access control [49]. Moreover, the scheme 
also allows data owners to delegate most of the computation tasks to untrusted cloud servers 
without disclosing the underlying data contents. 
The Ciphertext Policy-Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) was proposed after KP-ABE, 
by Bethencourt [50]. Different from KP-ABE, a ciphertext in CP-ABE is built upon an 
access policy, while a private key is associated with a set of attributes. A user can decrypt the 
data only if its attributes embedded in the private key match the access policy. Lewko 
proposed a decentralized CP-ABE scheme which allows multiple authorities to issue access 
right and private keys with a part of the attribute set [51]. It solved the user collusion 
problem by applying user’s unique global identity. Horvath further extended the 
decentralized CP-ABE scheme to reduce the computational burden of user revocation by 
removing the computations of revocation at cloud service providers and distributing them 
over service users [52]. Xu proposed a fine-grained document sharing system based on CP-
ABE, which refines users into different classes according to their privileges to access files 
[53]. A document is divided into multiple segments and encrypted by hierarchical keys. A 
user with a higher security class key can derive all its lower level keys. Although Xu’s 
scheme achieves fine-grained data access control, it is very difficult to manage both CP-ABE 
keys and hierarchical keys, especially where there are a large number of users in cloud 
environment. Wan proposed a hierarchical attribute-based solution in the cloud computing 
by organizing user attributes into different sets, where the same attribute can be assigned 
different values [54]. Moreover, it applied expiration time as an access constraint for user 
revocation, which made the scheme more efficient. 
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2.4 Security risks and privacy preservation in cloud computing 
While embracing the dynamic service provisioning, ubiquitous data access, optimized 
resource allocation and low-cost infrastructure, cloud users are also faced with security 
problems of data confidentiality and privacy leakage. 
2.4.1 Risks of data security in cloud computing 
Outsourced data security 
Apart from the security of data stored at cloud service providers, cloud computing brings 
additional security risks when the data owners outsourcing their sensitive data for data 
sharing on cloud servers. Although several works [55][56][57][58] were proposed to encrypt 
data before outsourcing to other users, and to use methods such as re-encryption and trusted 
third party to protect data confidentiality, they are facing problems in practical systems. On 
the one hand, they incur a large computational cost for encrypting all the data in the cloud, 
and lots of effort for user revocation and key management. On the other hand, it is difficult 
for data owners to know if the data has been tampered after outsourcing, especially when 
there are multiple owners of one file [24]. This fact may threat the integrity of data when 
sharing and outsourcing in the cloud environment. 
Malicious rating 
Comparing to encryption schemes with more computational cost, trust and reputation 
management provide a more computationally efficient way of protecting data security and 
access control in cloud environment. However, there could be malicious nodes or 
competitors who provide unfair ratings to affect the accuracy of trust and reputation. 
Although several works proposed to detect unfair ratings and malicious users [30][31][59], 
either of them requires a large amount of prior knowledge or use experience to assure the 
detection accuracy, or they can lead to false positive results to exclude eligible users. 
Multi-tenancy security 
Virtualization technology is now widely used to provide infrastructure sharing and resource 
optimization in cloud services. Cloud service providers can now support “Multi-Tenancy”, in 
which service users can store their data and deploy their data processing on the same 
physical hardware [60]. This service model poses security threats that a customer shares the 
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same physical hardware with its adversaries, and its resources (e.g., data, virtual machines, 
etc.) placed on the cloud servers can be attacked by the adversaries. Ristenpart shows how 
the malicious behaviors are carried out towards a customer when they share the same cloud 
server [60]. Factor proposed the Secure Logical Isolation for multi-tenancy cloud storage 
(SLIM) by predefining the principles to isolate the tenants’ resources [61]. Yang integrated 
the RBAC and attribute check mechanism to determine which resource that a user can access 
[62]. Li also proposed a RBAC based scheme for multi-tenancy cloud service, by embedding 
predefined security duty separations [63]. Tang proposed a RBAC based control scheme and 
integrated trust management to set trust relations among tenants [64]. 
2.4.2 Privacy preservation in cloud computing 
Privacy has been an essential issue that influences user’s adoption of cloud services. The 
privacy violation of some famous cloud services such as Facebook and iCloud, have leaded 
to increased concerns in terms of either personal or commercial information leakage. Many 
existing works [65][66][67][68][69][70][71] propose to solve the problems of privacy 
violation. The proposed schemes can be divided into two categories: non-cryptographic and 
cryptographic schemes. The main non-cryptographic scheme is data perturbation. Wang 
proposed a privacy preserving scheme based on data anonymity [65]. It hides a part of the 
user information and prevents deducting sensitive information from disclosed data. Pan 
proposed a retrievable data perturbation method for privacy preservation based on random 
noise perturbation [66]. It adds random noise to perturb data values, but remains the data 
covariance unchanged so that users can retrieve the original values. Haas proposed a privacy 
preserving system for electronic health records by applying a trusted third party to control 
the data access, and prevent service providers of data storage from accessing and disclosing 
data [67]. For cryptographic methods, Wang proposed a privacy preserving scheme based on 
a public key based homomorphic authenticator, and also applied a third party auditor [68]. 
He also proposed a secure and efficient method for ranked key word searching to provide 
privacy preservation for outsourced data [69]. This method enables relevance ranking instead 
of sending undifferentiated results, and develops a one-to-many order-preserving mapping 
technique to protect sensitive information. Leng proposed a privacy preserving scheme for 
personal health records based on predefined policies, and applied proxy re-encryption for 
flexible encryption and access right delegation [70]. Narayan proposed a privacy preserving 
Electronic Health Record (EHR) system based on attribute-based cryptography [71]. 
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Although there are many studies on protecting user data and information stored in the cloud 
environment, there are few works on privacy preservation in usage data, such as behavioral 
information, recently visited information, user devices and other usage histories which can 
be tracked and studied to violate user’s privacy [72]. 
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Chapter 3    Technical Preliminary and Access Control Schemes 
This section introduces the technical preliminaries, and three data access control schemes 
that are implemented and evaluated in the thesis work. These schemes enable secure data 
access control in cloud computing based on trust and reputation. 
3.1 Preliminary and cryptographic basics 
PRE and ABE are two important cryptographic techniques which are highly related to our 
work. In order to best understand the PRE and ABE, we will briefly introduce them below. 
We firstly introduce the bilinear map that is the basic of ABE. Notably, knowledge of basic 
mathematics, such as finite fields, groups and elliptic curves, are required to understand the 
cryptographic algorithms. However, an extensive introduction of these areas is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
3.1.1 Bilinear map 
Bilinear map, or bilinear pairing, is a basis of many cryptography paradigms. There are 
different definitions of bilinear map, depending on the type of group and elliptic curve. 
Generally speaking, a bilinear map is an operation that combines elements of two groups to 
yield an element of a third group. Here we outline two commonly used definitions of bilinear 
map that are proposed by Boneh, Franklin and Lynn [73][74][75].  
Symmetric pairing: 
Definition 3.1: Let  ,    be cyclic groups of large prime order  , and    be a ring of 
integers modulo  . Let   be a generator of  . A bilinear pairing or bilinear map   is an 
efficiently computable function: 
  :           
such that 
(i) Non-degeneracy:          . The map does not send all pairs in      to the element 
in   . If   is a generator of  , then        is a generator of   . 
(ii) Bilinearity:                    for all        . 
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The symmetric bilinear map is the original and simplest abstract definition of the pairing, 
and it is completely defined by the value it takes at       . The Diffie-Hellman problem [9] 
can be solved in the bilinear map, since given           , by Bilinearity and nondegenracy 
     if and only if                 . However, symmetric pairings can only be 
instantiated by using suitable super-singular elliptic curves. 
Asymmetric pairing: 
In order to allow a wider range of curves to be used, the asymmetric pairing looses the 
definition of symmetric pairing.  
Definition 3.2: Let          be cyclic groups of large prime order  . Assume the Diffie-
Hellman problem is hard in   . Let  :       be an efficiently computable group 
isomorphism. Let    be a generator of   . Set           (   is the generator of   ). A 
bilinear pairing   is an efficiently computable function: 
            
such that 
(i) Non-degeneracy:           .  
(ii) Bilinearity:     
    
            
   for all        . 
This modified definition allows a greater variety of pairings to be used on ordinary curves, 
and security proofs require only minimal changes because of the map  . However, there is a 
problem with hashing in this definition. It turns out that there is no known method to hash to 
an element of    such that its discrete log to some fixed base is unknown. This issue can 
complicate the design of some cryptosystems, and make the system designers give up 
asymmetric pairing in some cases.  
3.1.2 Proxy Re-Encryption 
Proxy cryptography was proposed by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [76], in which a proxy can 
convert ciphertexts from Alice into ciphertexts for Bob without seeing the underlying 
plaintext. In their Elgamal-based scheme, a proxy is entrusted to hold a re-encryption key 
   , which is created by Alice’s secret key   and Bob’s public key b. The proxy can use this 
re-encryption key to divert ciphertexts from Alice to Bob via computing the re-encryption 
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function. However, this scheme contains an inherent restriction: it is bidirectional; that is, the 
re-encryption key     can be used to divert ciphertexts from Alice to Bob and vice versa by 
computing        . Therefore, this scheme is only useful when the trust relationship 
between Alice and Bob is mutual. Moreover, users are believed not to collude with the proxy 
in case the proxy wants to recover the secret keys. 
In order to solve the problems within the scheme in [76], Ateniese improved the PRE 
algorithm by loosing the restrictions of trust relationship between users, and decreasing the 
security harm of collusion between users and the proxy [77]. The improved algorithm can be 
described as: 
Key generation: User     key pair is        
                   , where      is a 
random generator and               is a system parameter.           . 
Re-encryption key generation: User A delegates the access right to B by publishing the re-
encryption key        
      , computed from B’s public key    . 
First-level encryption: To encrypt a message       under     in a way that it can only 
be decrypted by the holder of    , the user outputs the ciphertext as        
        , 
where        is a random number. Through first-level encryption, the decryption right can 
only be retained by the holder of    , and cannot be delegated to others. 
Second-level encryption: To encrypt a message       under     in a way that it can be 
decrypted by A and other users who are delegated the decryption right by A, output      
          . 
Re-encryption: A proxy can divert a second-level ciphertext from A into a first-level 
ciphertext for B with re-encryption key      , by computing    
                and 
publishing        
            . 
Decryption: To decrypt a first-level ciphertext      with the secret key         , compute 
   
   
          
. To decrypt a ciphertext that has been re-encrypted, compute   
     
            
. 
To decrypt a second-level ciphertext, compute   
     
         
. 
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This scheme has some improvements by making the delegation unidirectional, which means 
if A delegates the access right to B, B can decrypt A’s message after re-encryption but A 
cannot access B’s ciphertexts. This is because the re-encryption key       cannot be used to 
compute       if A and the proxy do not know B’s secret key   . Moreover, even if B has 
been delegated the access right and colludes with the proxy, they can only recover the weak 
secret    , so that they cannot decrypt A’s first-level ciphertext [77]. In our implementation, 
we applied this PRE scheme. 
3.1.3 Ciphertext Policy-Attribute Based Encryption 
The Ciphertext Policy-Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) was proposed by Bethencourt 
[11]. A ciphertext in CP-ABE is built upon an access tree  , while a private key is 
associated with a set of attributes  . Generally, the CP-ABE algorithm has four operations 
that are defined in [11] as follows: 
Setup: Choose a symmetric bilinear map            , in which   is a bilinear group of 
prime order   and   is a generator of  . In addition, choose a security parameter   that 
determines the size of the groups. A hash function            , is employed to map an 
attribute from a binary string to a random group element.  
The system will choose two random exponents         , and use the parameters defined in 
the bilinear map and hash function, to publish the public key PK as : 
                
 
            
and the master key MK is (     . 
Encrypt: Since the message  is encrypted under an access tree, we firstly need to define an 
access tree . The access tree  is constructed by three functions: parent(x), att(x), and 
index(x) (x is a node in the tree).  
parent(x): The parent node of x. 
att(x): The attribute of node x. 
index(x): The index number of node x. 
Let    be a threshold value, and denote        if a set of attributes   satisfy the access 
tree   . The algorithm encrypts the message as follows: 
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(i) Choose a polynomial    for each node   in the tree , starting from the root node  . Then 
set the degree    of the polynomial    as         , for each node   in the tree. 
(ii) For each non-root node  , set                             and choose    other points 
of the polynomial    randomly; for the root node  , set         (s is a random number: 
      ) and choose    other points randomly. 
(iii) Let   be the set of leaf nodes in . The ciphertext is computed and published as: 
                                   
        
           
     
   
KeyGen: The secret key SK is generated upon a set of attributes  . The algorithm firstly 
chooses a random number       , and random        for each attribute     . The secret 
key SK is computed as: 
   
 
 
 
   
     
  
            
           
     
 
 
 
  
Decrypt: First, define a recursive function DecryptNode(E, SK, x), which needs a ciphertext 
E, a secret key SK and a node x from . Then the decryption algorithm is designed as 
follows: 
(i) For a leaf node x, we let          and the function is computed as follows: 
                      
        
    
      
  
                   
                
                            
                
  
(ii) For a non-leaf node x, it calls DecryptNode(E, SK, z) for all child nodes z of x and stores 
the output as   .    is an arbitrary    sized set of child nodes z such that      . The    
function is computed as: 
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(iii) Apply the above function to the root node  . If the access tree is satisfied by the attribute 
set  , then A = DecryptNode(E, SK,  ) =               =          . The ciphertext is 
decrypted as: 
  
  
     
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
     
  
 
 
 
         
 
 
  
         
        
   
The author also proposed a delegation function of private keys, which is an optional function 
in order to subtract attributes from the original attribute set   to create a new more strict 
attribute set         . Since the new attribute set      , the generated new    is a secret 
key for   and it is equivalent to one received directly from the authority (e.g., the encryptor). 
We adopt the idea of CP-ABE to relate a ciphertext to an access policy while public key pair 
is based on attributes, but modify the equations to integrate individual trust to the data access 
control schemes and implementation. We will introduce the schemes in Section 3.4 and the 
implementation in Chapter 4. 
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3.2 Trust and reputation management in the data access control schemes 
Trust and reputation are mentioned in many literature resources that we introduced in 
Chapter 2. In this section, we provide technical details of trust and reputation management 
proposed by Yan [5], which are applied in the three data access control schemes and later 
implementations. 
3.2.1 Trust assessment 
The trust assessment model is built based on the user behaviors in the mobile social network 
[5]. The behaviors can be classified into three categories:  
 Mobile calls 
 Messages 
 Local instant interaction 
The trust level between two persons then can be automatically assessed based on the 
characteristics (e.g. number of calls, weight, etc.) of the above three categories. Table II 
gives the notations that will be used in the formula. 
The formula of trust level assessment is designed as follows: 
                            
                                                       
                                       
Besides taking the behaviors as part of the parameters, the formula also considers the 
previous trust level, priority and punishment factor. In addition, the trust level assessment 
can be linked to a certain context based on key word extraction, in which the data owner can 
set the data access policies according to the context. 
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Table II The notations used in the trust assessment formula 
Symbols Description Remark 
         The number of calls made by i to j  
         The number of messages sent by i to j  
         The number of interactions initiated by i to j  
        The trust level of j assessed by i;          is the old value 
of         
 
     
The Rayleigh cumulative distribution function      
         
   
   
  to model the impact of integer number I, 
where    , is a parameter that inversely controls how 
fast the number I impacts the increase of     . Parameter 
  can be set from 0 to theoretically , to capture the 
characteristics of different scenarios. We use      to 
model the influence of the number of calls, messages and 
interactions on social relationships. 
 
   The weight parameter to show the importance of voice call            
   The weight parameter to show the importance of message  
   The weight parameter to show the importance of instant 
interaction 
 
        The priority level of j in i’s social networks  
        The punishment factor of j in i’s view  
     
The Sigmoid function       
 
    
, which is used to 
normalize a value into (0, 1) in order to unify an evaluated 
trust level into an expected scope 
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3.2.2 Reputation Generation 
The reputation model is proposed in [5], and it is composed of two parts: the reputation    
contributed by the user feedback; the reputation    contributed by performance monitoring 
and reporting. Table III gives the notations that will be used in the formulas. 
Table III The notations used in the reputation generation 
Symbols Description 
   reputation composed by user feedback  
   reputation composed by performance monitoring and reporting 
     
The Rayleigh cumulative distribution function  
              
   
   
  
              
      
 
 
 
 
t time 
   reputation evaluation time 
k user k 
  parameter for controlling time decaying,  
K the total number of votes 
       user k’s voting at time t 
       user k’s credibility of providing feedback at time t,  
             
The reputation generation formulas are designed as follows: 
User feedback   :  
    
    
 
                 
      
 
     , 
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Performance monitoring and reporting   : 
    
 
     
       
Final reputation aggregated by combining    and   : 
       
      
              
        
      
              
       
 
3.3 Scheme 1: Controlling cloud data access based on reputation 
Scheme 1 was proposed by Yan, Li and Kantola [29]. It intends to control data access in a 
cloud environment by applying PRE and reputation management. There are four kinds of 
entities in the system model: Data Owners, Cloud Service Providers (CSP), Reputation 
Center (RC), and Users. The RC is fully trusted and employed for reputation management, as 
well as helping the data owners check if the users meet the access policies. CSP is 
responsible for data storage, controlling data access including data re-encryption and issuing 
access right to eligible users. Data Owners are the ones who own the right of data access and 
altering, and Users are the ones who request for data access. 
The proposed scheme: 
We adopt Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) algorithm that enables RC to issue a re-encryption 
key and access right to eligible entities. The procedures in the scheme can be grouped into 
four phases: System setup, New data creation, Data access, and User revocation. 
System setup: Each entity in the system matins a public key and private key pair under the 
public key infrastructure of PRE. The global parameters for key generation are shared within 
the system. 
New data creation: A data owner encrypts its data using a symmetric key DEK, and then 
encrypts the symmetric key DEK using the RC’s public key pk_RC. The data can be either 
encrypted in First-level encryption of PRE so that the data can only be accessed and 
decrypted by the data owner itself, or encrypted in Second-level encryption that allows 
delegating access rights to other users. Then the data owner stores the data along with the 
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encrypted DEK to the CSP, and specifies an access policy to RC. The plaintext of data and 
DEK is hidden from CSP, thus provides data protection and privacy preservation. The CSP 
in this scheme functions as a proxy, which indirectly delegates an access right to an entity 
without learning anything about the secret data. 
Data access: A user u firstly sends an access request to the CSP. The CSP would forward the 
request to RC, who is responsible for evaluating the user’s latest reputation and decides if the 
user meets the access policy. If the user is eligible, RC will generate a re-encryption key 
rk_RC->u. The CSP conducts the ciphertext re-encryption based on the rk_RC->u received 
from the RC, and send the re-encrypted data to the user. The user can decrypt the data using 
its own private key sk_u and obtained DEK. 
User revocation: User revocation is handled by RC who retains a list of revoked users that 
are no longer eligible to access the data. And the CSP blocks the revoked user from 
accessing the data. 
We adopt punishment rate in an insurance agreement between an entity and RC. The 
punishment rate is set based on an entity’s reputation level, in case of data disclosure from 
the entity. The higher the reputation, the lower the punishment rate in an agreement. In this 
way, the entities in a system are encouraged to provide honest behaviors and better 
performances. In practical systems, the insurance business can be run by RCs to guarantee 
legal data access, and compensate data owners if there is any illegal data disclosure. CSPs in 
a system will pay annual fee to RC for issuing re-encryption keys and managing reputations. 
Detailed steps of access procedure are illustrated in Fig.1. 
Step 1: The data owner firstly encrypts the data using DEK, denoted as E(DEK, data). And it 
encrypts the DEK using RC’s public key pk_RC, denoted as E(pk_RC, DEK). Then the data 
owner uploads the encrypted data to the CSP, and specifies the data access policy to RC. 
Step 2: The user sends a data access request to CSP for ciphertext E(pk_RC, DEK), and 
encrypted data E(DEK, data). 
Step 3: CSP firstly verifies the user’s ID to check if it is valid in the system. If the user’s ID 
is valid, the CSP forwards the data request to the RC. Otherwise, the request is rejected. 
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Figure 1 System model of cloud data access control based on reputation 
Step 4: The RC evaluates the user’s latest reputation, and decide if the user meets the access 
policy. If the user is eligible, the RC sets an insurance agreement based on the user’s 
reputation level, in case of data disclosure. Otherwise, the request is rejected. 
Step 5: The RC generates a re-encryption key rk_RC->u=RG(sk_RC, pk_u), in which 
RG(sk_RC, pk_u) is the re-encryption key generation function, based on its own private key 
sk_RC and user’s public key pk_u. 
Step 6: The CSP conducts the ciphertext re-encryption R(rk_RC->u, E(pk_RC, DEK)) = 
E(pk_u, DEK), and sends the re-encrypted data E(pk_u, DEK) to the user. Therefore, the user 
can decrypt the data using its own secret key sk_u and obtained DEK.  
If later on, the user wants to access the data again but no longer eligible, the RC will inform 
the CSP to block the user from accessing the data. 
3.4 Scheme 2: Trust assessment controlled personal data access based on   
      mobile social networking 
Scheme 2 is designed for controlling cloud data access based on mobile social networking, 
by using trust assessment algorithm and CP-ABE for data encryption. There are three kinds 
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of entities in the system model: Data Owner, CSP, and Users who request the data. The CSP 
is considered semi-trusted, and is responsible for storing data and user validity check. The 
access right is fully controlled by Data Owners, who issue the decryption keys based on the 
Users’ trust levels evaluated based on their social networking activities, behavior and 
experience.  
The proposed scheme: 
The scheme can be applied in an environment of mobile cloud computing. A mobile user can 
save its sensitive personal data at a data center offered by a CSP. For ensuring safe data 
access by other trustworthy users in the network, the mobile users make use of trust levels 
accumulated and analyzed from their individual mobile social networking records. The 
mobile user can issue secret keys to eligible users with sufficient trust to access the personal 
data at the CSP. 
Trust level of a user is evaluated based on the activities, behaviors, and experiences in 
mobile networks. In the scheme, we divide individual trust into discrete levels. For example, 
TL_i represents user i’s trust level TL, and TL can be from 0 to     , where      is the 
maximum level of TL. 
In our scheme, plaintext is hidden from the CSPs in order to provide data protection and 
privacy preservation. The CSPs are responsible for data storage, verifying users’ ID, and 
blocking eligible users from accessing the data. Trust evaluation and secret key issuing is 
handled by data owners themselves to ensure safe data access by trustworthy users. A user 
firstly sends an access request to a CSP, and the CSP will check if the user’s ID in the system 
is valid. If it is the case, the CSP will forward the access request to the data owner, and the 
data owner will decide if the user who sends the request is eligible to access the data. 
The user revocation is handled by the CSP based on the data owner’s notifications about the 
non-eligible users. The encrypted data could be renewed by encrypting within a new access 
policy tree, or the access can be blocked by announcing the expired secret key. Although the 
CSP is semi-trusted, it is encouraged to perform well by applying the reputation mechanism 
to evaluate the CSP’s performance. The CSP’s reputation is based on the user feedback, and 
will be published to all users in the system. 
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Scheme algorithms: 
The scheme contains two main algorithms: Trust assessment and CP-ABE based access 
control. Trust assessment algorithm is based on the formula in [5]. We adopt the idea of 
conventional CP-ABE, but integrate Individual Trust Level (TL) as an attribute in our 
modified CP-ABE algorithm. Concretely, the operations for our modified CP-ABE algorithm 
are: Setup, InitiateUser, CreateTrustPK, IssueTrustSK, Encrypt and Decrypt. 
Setup: The Setup operation generates a system public key PK and a master key MK based 
on bilinear paring, 
                     
  ,      
where P is a random point in  , and     . 
InitiateUser: The InitiateUser takes public key PK and master key MK as inputs, and 
generates a user’s public key PK_u and secret key SK_u, 
          , SK_u = MK *      =         
where      . It also chooses a random hash function      :      
     from a finite 
family of hash functions. 
CreateTrustPK: The CreateTrustPK operation generates CP-ABE public attribute key 
based on trust levels. It is executed by the data owners to encrypt the data and control the 
access right.  The CreateTrustPK  checks the TL related policies for data access, and output 
the public attribute key            for each attribute    , where      Ī    and   Ī   is the 
maximum level of TL. The            consists of two parts: 
                            
 SK_u                           
  SK_u       
Encrypt: The Encrypt operation takes the attribute public key                 Ī     to 
encrypt the symmetric key DEK, based on the access policy  related to TL. The output 
ciphertext CT is 
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, where    is a random value and       . The ciphertext CT consists of the tuple    
           , and it iterates over all i=1,…,m (m<    ), where m represents the number of 
selected TL in the access tree . 
IssueTrustSK: The IssueTrustSK is executed after verifying user u’ eligibility and if u’ TL 
is equal or above the required TL level. It takes   s pubic key as input and issues the 
TrustSK 
           
                                         
Decrypt: The user decrypts the ciphertext to get the symmetric key DEK using its own 
secret key SK_u’ and the TrustSK             
   issued by the data owner. The output 
DEK is 
       
    
                
    
    SK_   
 
Then the user can decrypt the encrypted data using the DEK. 
Fig.2 shows the detailed procedures of data access control based on trust assessment and CP-
ABE encryption in mobile social networks.  
Step 1: The data owner conducts trust evaluations based on activities, behaviors and user 
experiences which are related to his/her usage in the mobile network. After the trust 
evaluation, the data owner determines the requirements of trust levels specified in his/her 
access policy. The data owner then encrypts the data using a secret symmetric key DEK, and 
encrypts the DEK using its own CP-ABE public key PK_TL which is based on specified trust 
levels. The encrypted data and symmetric key are denoted as E(DEK, data) and E(PK_TL, 
DEK). Then it uploads the encrypted data and DEK to the CSP, as well as sends the access 
policy based on the required trust level TL. 
Step 2: A user firstly sends an access request to both the data owner and CSP. 
Step 3: The CSP verifies the user’s ID in the system in order to check if the user’s ID is valid, 
or if the user is in the blacklist. If the user’s ID is valid, the CSP forwards the access request 
to the data owner. Otherwise, the request is rejected. 
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Step 4: The data owner evaluates the user’s trust level TL based on previous behaviors and 
activities. If the user is trustworthy, the data owner issues a secret key SK_TL based on the 
user’s trust level TL, and also sends corresponding access policy . Otherwise, the request 
is rejected.  
Step 5: After receiving the secret key SK_TL and access policy  from the data owner, the 
user again sends a data access request along with the access policy  to the CSP. 
Step 6: The CSP checks if the access policy from the user is the same as that received from 
the data owner. If both of the policies match, the CSP sends the required data to the user, so 
that the user can decrypt using the SK_TL. 
 
Figure 2 Procedure of cloud data access control based on trust assessment 
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3.5 Scheme 3: A scheme of heterogeneous data access control based on  
      trust and reputation in cloud computing 
Scheme 3 proposed a flexible multi-dimensional control on cloud data access [78]. It is a 
heterogeneous scheme which combines the techniques in Scheme 1 and Scheme 2. There are 
four kinds of entities in the system model: Data Owners, Cloud Service Providers (CSP), 
Reputation Center (RC), and Users. The RCs are fully trusted and employed for reputation 
management, as well as helping the data owners check if the users meet the access policies. 
The CSPs are responsible for data storage, controlling data access including data re-
encryption and issuing access right to eligible users. Data Owners are the ones who own the 
right of access and altering, and Users are the ones who request for data access. 
The proposed scheme: 
In this scheme, we proposed multi-dimensional control on cloud data access based on 
individual trust evaluated by the data owners, and/or public reputation evaluated by one or 
multiple RCs. To be more concretely, a data owner firstly encrypts its data with a symmetric 
key DEK, and then the data owner can divide the DEK into several segments K0, K1, K2… 
Kn,    . K0, K1, K2… Kn are encrypted with public keys from different RCs which are 
employed to evaluate reputations and control data access.      can be encrypted with a 
public key PK_TL which is related to individual trust levels. After the data encryption, the 
data owner uploads the encrypted data and key segments to the CSP, and specifies the access 
policy to each of the RCs. In order to access data, a user needs to be authorized by all the 
RCs, and collect all key segments to recover the DEK for decryption. 
The size of the key segments K0, K1, K2… Kn can be flexibly set by data owners, according 
to different application scenarios or security requirements. If a data owner would like to 
control data access only by itself, the symmetric key DEK will not be divided, and is 
encrypted with a public key PK_TL which is related to individual trust levels. If a data owner 
would like the RCs to the control data access, all the key segments are encrypted with the 
RCs’ public keys. 
User revocation is achieved by applying a blacklist which contains the ID of non-trusted or 
non-eligible users. The blacklist is managed by the CSP, and can be updated according to RC 
or data owners’ notification and feedback. 
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Scheme algorithms: 
The scheme consists of four main algorithms: Key generation, Symmetric key DEK division 
and combination, PRE, modified CP-ABE which is proposed in [23]. 
Key generation: Key Generation contains three kinds of keys: Symmetric key DEK for data 
encryption, public key pairs for PRE, and key pairs for CP-ABE. The key generation for CP-
ABE consists of system public key PK, master key MK, user public key pairs and Individual 
Trust public key and secret key. The key generation can be conducted by users or by a 
trustworthy user agent. 
Symmetric key DEK division and combination: Key division is operated by the data 
owner based on its data access control policy. The symmetric encryption key DEK is divided 
into n+1 parts, where n is the number of RCs which are employed by the data owner to 
control its data access based on the access policy. Key combination is operated by the user 
who receives all pieces of the symmetric key DEK, and aggregates all partial keys together to 
get a complete key DEK for decryption. 
PRE: The data owner encrypts n pieces of partial symmetric key DEK using corresponding 
RC’s PRE public key, and stores the encrypted data and key files in the CSPs. The RCs 
control data access right by evaluating the access policy and users’ reputation, and conduct 
re-encryption key generation if a user is eligible for accessing the data. The CSPs conduct 
the re-encryption and send the re-encrypted data to the user. 
CP-ABE: CP-ABE is applied for the purpose of integrating the individual trust level (TL) 
into the data access control mechanism, and controlling access right by the data owner itself. 
One piece of symmetric key DEK is encrypted using the data owner’s Individual Trust public 
key, and is stored in the CSPs. After verifying the individual trust level of a user who 
requires the data, the data owner will then issue the user an Individual TL secret key, and 
inform the CSPs to send the encrypted data to the user.  
Fig.3 illustrates the detailed procedures of two-dimensional data access control in the 
proposed scheme. 
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Figure 3 Procedure of cloud data access control based on heterogeneous scheme 
Step 1: The data owner encrypts its data using a symmetric key DEK, and divides the DEK 
into two segments:    and   .    is encrypted with the RC’s public key pk_RC, and    is 
encrypted with a public key PK_TL which is related to individual trust levels. The encrypted 
data is denoted as E(DEK, data), and the key segments are denoted as E(pk_RC,   ) and 
E(PK_TL,   ). Then the data owner uploads the encrypted data to the CSP, and specifies an 
access policy to both the CSP and RC. 
Step 2: The user sends an access request to the CSP, and waits for responses. 
Step 3: The CSP verifies the user’s ID and checks the blacklist in order to decide whether to 
forward the access request to the RC. If the user’s ID is valid and it is not in the blacklist, the 
CSP will forward the request to the RC. Otherwise, the request is rejected. 
Step 4: The RC evaluates the user’s reputation, and decides if the user meets the access 
policy. If the user is eligible, the RC will set an insurance agreement with the user in case of 
illegal data disclosure. Otherwise, the request is rejected. 
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Step 5: The RC issues the re-encryption key rk_RC->u=RG(sk_RC, pk_u), in which 
RG(sk_RC, pk_u) is the re-encryption key generation function, based on the RC’s own 
private key sk_RC and user’s public key pk_u. 
Step 6: After receiving the re-encryption key rk_RC from the RC, the CSP forwards the 
access request to the data owner. 
Step 7: The data owner evaluates the user’s trust level TL based on previous behaviors and 
activities. If the user is trustworthy, the data owner issues a secret key SK_TL based on the 
user’s trust level TL, and also sends corresponding access policy . Otherwise, the request 
is rejected. 
Step 8: After receiving the secret key SK_TL and access policy  from the data owner, the 
user again sends a data access request along with the access policy  to the CSP. 
Step 9: The CSP checks if the access policy from the user is the same as that received from 
the data owner. If both of the policies match, the CSP conducts the ciphertext re-encryption 
R(rk_RC->u, E(pk_RC,   )) = E(pk_u,   ), and sends E(DEK, data), re-encrypted data 
E(pk_u,   ) and E(PK_TL,   ) to the user.  
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Chapter 4    Scheme Implementation 
In this chapter, we will firstly introduce the implementation design of each scheme. Then we 
will present the implementation of the essential algorithms, and SSL-based network 
communications. 
4.1 Implementation design 
We evaluate the three schemes by implementing their basic algorithms and functions. The 
implementation of Scheme 1 contains four main function blocks, shown in Fig.4: Encryption, 
Decryption, PRE Algorithm, and Reputation Evaluation. The implementation of Reputation 
Evaluation is based on the equations described in Section 3.2.2. 
 
Figure 4  Main function blocks: reputation based cloud data access control 
Fig.5 shows the main function blocks in Scheme 2: Encryption, Decryption, Individual Trust 
Level (TL) Assessment, and TL based CP-ABE algorithm. The TL based CP-ABE includes 
Master Key Generation, Public/Secret Key Generation, TL_Public/Secret Key Generation, 
TL_Encryption/Decryption. The implementation of Individual TL Generation and 
Assessment is based on the equations presented in Section 3.2.1. 
 
Figure 5  Main function blocks: Individual TL based CP-ABE scheme 
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Except for cryptographic algorithms and reputation/TL assessment, Scheme 3 has additional 
blocks: Key Division/Combination, in order to flexibly control data access by either the data 
owner, or RCs or both, shown in Fig.6.  
 
Figure 6 Main function blocks: heterogeneous scheme 
The communication between each entity is based on client/server mode, through different 
ports on localhost. And the data transmission is secured by applying the SSL protocol. Since 
we focus on the performance of data access control schemes in this thesis, the collection of 
network data, such as voting and user behavior is beyond our scope. These data are 
simulated to support the scheme evaluation. 
4.2 Basic functions 
In the following sections, we introduce the implementation of main functions related to the 
three schemes. 
4.2.1 Implementation of PRE 
PRE belongs to Asymmetric Cryptography, and the algorithm is based on Elliptic Curves 
and Pairing. In order to implement PRE, we utilized Multi-precision Integer and Rational 
Arithmetic C Library (MIRACL, http://www.certivox.com/miracl), and JHU-MIT Proxy Re-
encryption Libarary (http://spar.isi.jhu.edu/~mgreen/prl/). 
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Library overview 
MIRACL is a cryptographic C library that supports multiple crypto algorithms, such as AES, 
RSA, DSA digital signature and so on. It is applied in our implementation because MIRACL 
is widely used for Elliptic Curve Cryptography, and is particularly adept at Pairing-Based 
Cryptography. MIRACL contains efficient algorithms for computations with very large 
numbers, and it has inline C++ wrapper, which can greatly simplify program development in 
C++. MIRACL has a new data type defined as big for large integers, and some data structure, 
such as ZZn and ECn, which are used in the program. These data types are defined to 
simplify the manipulation of points and computation on elliptic curves. MIRACL also 
defines many routines to support the computation of the defined data types, such as add, 
divide, and pow. Functions like big_to_bytes and bytes_to_big are defined to support the 
transition between large rational numbers and binaries.  
JHU-MIT Proxy Re-encryption Library is a C++ library designed for proxy re-encryption. It 
provides many utility functions, such as parameter generation, serialization, and data type 
transition. The JHU-MIT library is based on MIRACL. 
Essential algorithms: 
Global parameter generation: One important difference between proxy re-encryption and 
other public cryptography methods is that all entities in a system would share the same 
global parameters. The global parameters define the size of prime field, and initiate elliptic 
curve computation. generate_params(global_parameters) function firstly asks for a seed to 
initiate the random number generation using irand(seed). Then it defines the order of group 
 , which is 160 bits, and generates the size of the prime field P, which is 512 bits. Finally it 
generates the generator of group  , and the value of   which is a basic value of pairing. All 
the global parameters are written into the publicParam file and shared in the system. 
Public/Secret key generation: Every entity in the system uses the global parameters to 
generate their own public/secret key pairs. keygen(params, publicKey, secretKey) function 
takes global parameters as input, and outputs a public key and a secret key. The secret key is 
kept to itself, and the public key is used by others for encryption or key delegation. The 
secretKey contains two Big numbers a1 and a2, generated by rand(). The publicKey consists 
of    , and     which are generated using ecap(global_parameters) by doing the distortion 
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map and fast pairing. The public key size is 1024 bits, which is two times of the field size of 
the underlying elliptic curve.  
Key delegation: One entity can generate a re-encryption key to delegate the access right to 
other users. The key delegation function PRE_delegate(global_parameters, SK, PK, resKey) 
takes global parameters, its own secret key SK, other user’s public key PK as input, and 
outputs the re-encryption key resKey. The re-encryption key is computed as         
     . 
Ciphertext: The operations of ciphertext contain Encryption, Decryption, and Re-encryption.  
PRE_level2_encryption(global_parameters, plaintext, PK, ciphertext) takes global 
parameters, a public key PK, and plaintext as input, and outputs the ciphertext. The function 
firstly transforms the plain data from text to m, which is a Big data type, and randomly 
generate value k for the latter computation. The first part of the ciphertext c1 is computed as 
k*g (g is the generator of group  ), and the second part c2 is computed as m*pow(PK, k), 
where pow() is the power operation defined in MIRACL. 
PRE _decryption() takes global parameters, ciphertext, its own secret key SK as input, and 
outputs the plaintext. The plaintext is computed as c2/pow(c1, inverse(SK)). 
PRE_reencryption(global_parameters, originalCiphertext, rekey, newCiphertext) takes 
global parameters, delegation key resKey, original ciphertext as input, and outputs new 
ciphertext. The function remains the second part c2 of the original ciphertext, and computes 
the first part c1 as ecap(c1, resKey, params.q, params.cube, res1), where params.q, 
params.cube belongs to global parameters and res1 is the output. 
Utility functions: There are some utility functions defined to support the PRE algorithm. 
Table IV presents the main utility functions in the implementation. 
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Table IV Utility functions 
Functions Description 
ReadFromPlaintext() Read plaintext from file  
ReadFromParam() Read parameters from file 
ReadPublicKeyFile() Read public key from file 
ReadSecretKeyFile() Read secret key from file 
PRE_PK_serialize() Serialize public key to binaries for transmission 
PRE_SK_serialize() Serialize secret key to binaries for transmission 
PRE_PK_deserialize() 
Deserialize public key to PRE_PK data type for 
computation 
PRE_SK_deserialize() 
Deserialize secret key to PRE_PK data type for 
computation 
PRECiphertext_serialize() Serialize ciphertext to binaries for transmission 
PRECiphertext_deserialize() 
Deserialize ciphertext to ciphertext data type for 
computation 
4.2.2 Implementation of CP-ABE 
The TL-based CP-ABE proposed in Scheme 2 is a class of pairing based cryptography. It 
applies Individual TL as the attribute in the access policy tree. Public/Secret key pair is 
related to the attributes, while the ciphertext is related to an access policy. In order to 
implement the pairing based CP-ABE algorithm, we applied the Pairing-Based Cryptography 
(PBC) Library (http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/), which is an open C library that supports 
multiple cryptographic methods and performs the mathematical operations underlying 
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pairing-based cryptosystems. Bison/Yacc parser generator was applied in the implementation 
for policy and attribute parsing. 
Library overview 
PBC Library is an open C library that is widely used in many cryptosystems, especially in 
pairing-based cryptosystems. It is designed to improve the speed and portability of the 
implementation, and it provides routines such as elliptic curve arithmetic and pairing 
computation. One important merit of PBC is that it provides hands on functions that can be 
used by programmers who can concentrate on the properties of the cryptosystems, rather 
than the underneath number theories. For managing data utilities like bit/byte operation or 
dynamic arrays, we apply GLIB, which is a low-level system lib written in C. GLIB provides 
advanced data structures and utility functions.  
Bison/Yacc (http://www.gnu.org/software/bison/) is applied as a parser generator to convert 
readable text into computer languages. By describing the input structure (called grammar 
rules), designing code to be invoked when these rules are recognized, and functions to deal 
with the basic input, the user can use Yacc to parse the input stream into computer languages 
and invoke the related operations. Bison is a general parse generator and upward compatible 
with Yacc. 
Essential algorithms 
Policy/Attribute parser: We apply Bison/Yacc as a Policy/Attribute parser to convert input 
policy and attributes into computer language for cryptographic computation.  After 
downloading and installing Bison, we designed the grammar rules for the parser and the 
functions to invoke and analyze the input streams according to the grammar rules. The 
grammar rules and parse functions are written in the file policy.y, where .y format means that 
the codes are written in Yacc format. Fig.7 shows the grammar rules for parsing the input 
policy/attribute. 
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Figure 7 Grammar rules for policy/attribute parse 
In the above grammar rules, the left column is the designed format for the input policy, and 
the right column is the function which should be invoked when recognizing the input policy. 
In the policy format column, the tokens (the basic element in the expression, e.g. ‘TAG’, 
‘number’, etc.) are split in space. And the expression contains three kinds of operation, 
which are AND/OR, arithmetic operation, and comparison. The comma ‘,’ is defined to 
separate different policies in the policy array. In the right column, there are functions that are 
defined to analyze the input policies after their corresponding expressions are recognized by 
the parser. The dollar symbol “$$” is a pseudovariable which represents the returned value of 
the function. 
After the design of policy/attribute parser, it is necessary to transform the policy.y file into 
policy.c file, in order to include it in the program. 
 
 
 
The above bison command is used to transform .y file to .c file which can be invoked in the 
program. The input-file is the .y file, and the output-file is the specified output .c file. If the 
program is written in C++, the postfix of the input file could be assigned as .ypp, so that the 
output file is in .cpp format. 
$ bison    input-file    -o    output-file 
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System initiation: The System initiation includes pairing type define, system Master Key 
(MK) generation, and system Public Key (PK) generation. In PBC Library, there are two 
basic data types that are widely used in our program. 
element_t: The basic element of algebraic structure. 
pairing_t:  The pairings where elements belong to. 
element_t is used to declare algebraic variables, and pairing_t is used to declare a pairing. 
We apply the symmetric pairing Type A in our implementation, and initiate the pairing 
buffer before applying the pairing operation. Table V lists the functions used to initiate the 
elements. 
Table V List of functions for element initiation 
Functions Description 
element_init_G1(element_t e, 
pairing_t pairing) 
Initiate an element in group   
element_init_GT(element_t e, 
pairing_t pairing) 
Initiate an element in group    
element_init_Zr(element_t e, pairing_t 
pairing) 
Initiate an element in integer ring    
pairing_init_set_buf(pairing_t pairing, 
const char *s, size_t len) 
Pairing initiation, where *s stands for the 
description of the pairing type, and len is the 
maximum of the buffer length. 
After element initiation, we can apply element_pow_zn(element_t x, element_t a, element_t n) 
for      computation, and pairing_apply(element_t p, element_t h,  element_t a, pairing_t 
pairing) to conduct the pairing operation. Function node_initiate(&pub_u, &prv_u) is to 
generate an entity’s public key pk_u and secret key sk_u. It takes the system public key PK 
and the master key MK as input, and outputs its public/secret key pairs. 
Individual TL Public/Secret key pair generation: The Individual TL Public/Secret key 
pair integrates the input attributes in the generation process. And in this scheme, the 
attributes are different TLs. For TL public key PK_TL, it traverses all the Individual TL to 
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cover all the attributes in the encryption. The program is designed to firstly read the input 
attributes, and invoke the parser by calling the function parse_attribute(GSList* alist, char** 
argv), where argv represents the input attributes and alist is a linked list for storing the 
parsed attributes. Then the program calls pub_unserialize(GByteArray* pk, int) to unserialize 
the system PK to a data structure for computation. Function trust_pub_keygen(pub_t* pk, 
char** attrs) takes the system public key pk and parsed attributes as input, and outputs the 
Individual TL public key PK_TL. Fig.8 shows the work flow of the PK_TL generation. 
Input TLs as 
Attributes
Parse 
Attributes
Start
Extract ith 
Attribute (TLi)
PK_TLi 
Generation
Append PK_TLi 
to PK_TL
Is i=maximum 
level of TL?
i++
Output PK_TL
End
Y
N
                               
Input TL as 
Attribute
Parse 
Attribute (TL)
Start
SK_TL 
Generation
Output SK_TL
End
 
                  Figure 8 PK_TL generation                                                                   Figure 9 SK_TL generation 
The generation of Individual TL secret key SK_TL only includes the issued TL as the 
attribute. Function trust_prv_keygen(pub_u* pk_u, pub_t* pub, char** attr) takes user’s 
public key pk_u, system public key pub, and issued TL as input, and returns the TL secret 
key SK_TL. Fig.9 shows the work flow of SK_TL generation. 
In order to invoke the function of TL key generation, we design the command syntax to 
assure that all the compulsory parameters are prepared. 
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Command syntax for PK_TL generation: 
trust_pub_keygen    [-h]  [-o  FILE]  [INPUTFILE]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]……[     ] 
Option: 
-h print command format message 
-o specify the name of the output file 
INPUTFILE the system public key file required for PK_TL generation 
 
Command syntax for SK_TL generation: 
trust_prv_keygen    [-h]  [-o  FILE]  [INPUTFILE1]  [INPUTFILE2]  [  ] 
Option: 
-h print command format message 
-o specify the name of the output file 
INPUTFILE1 the system public key file required for PK_TL generation 
INPUTFILE2 the user’s public key file required for PK_TL generation 
 
Ciphertext-Policy Encryption/Decryption: The Encryption algorithm trust_enc(pub_t* pk, 
trust_pub* pk_tl, element_t m, char* policy) takes the system public key pk, the TL public 
key pk_tl, the plaintext, and the policy as input, and outputs the ciphertext which is encrypted 
according to the policy tree. It firstly parses the input policy by applying the function 
parse_policy_postfix(char* policy), and then fills out the policy tree with required attribute 
nodes (Individual TLs) and threshold k. fill_trust_policy(policy_t* p, pub_t* pub, trust_pub* 
pub_tl, element_t m) is the essential function in the encryption algorithm. It implements a 
recursive algorithm which extracts every leaf node (Individual TLs with no child nodes) in 
the policy tree, and conducts encryption with the leaf node. In our scheme, the policy tree 
normally has two layers since we take Individual TL as the attribute. The bottom layer 
consists of all the attributes for Individual TLs. The second layer is the result of AND/OR 
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operations according to the specified access policy. Fig.10 shows the work flow of the 
encryption algorithm. 
Decryption bswabe_trust_dec(cph_t* cph, trust_prv* prv_tl, prv_u* prv_u, pub_t* pk) takes 
ciphertext, TL secret key, user’s secret key and system public key as input, and outputs the 
plaintext. It also implements a recursive algorithm dec_trust_policy(policy_t* p, trust_prv* 
prv_tl, prv_u* prv_u, pub_t* pub, element_t m) that invokes itself until it reaches all the leaf 
nodes to get the Individual TLs in the policy tree. By extracting all the leaf nodes, it 
compares each leaf node with the issued Individual TL recognized in the TL secret key until 
it finds out the match. Fig.11 presents the work flow of the decryption algorithm. 
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Figure 10 Encryption work flow                            Figure 11 Decryption work flow  
 
Command syntax for Encryption: 
trust_enc    [-h]  [-o  FILE]  [INPUTFILE1]  [INPUTFILE2]  [POLICY] 
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Option: 
-h print command format message 
-o specify the name of the ciphertext file 
INPUTFILE1 the system public key file required for encryption 
INPUTFILE2 the PK_TL file required for encryption 
POLICY specify the access policy (e.g., TL > 3) 
             
Command syntax for Decryption: 
trust_dec    [-h]  [-o  FILE]  [INPUTFILE1]  [INPUTFILE2]  [INPUTFILE3] 
Option: 
-h print command format message 
-o specify the name of the output file 
INPUTFILE1 the system public key file required for decryption 
INPUTFILE2 the user’s secret key file required for decryption 
INPUTFILE3 the SK_TL file required for decryption 
 
4.2.3 Implementation of reputation/ individual TL assessment model 
Reputation model: 
The reputation model consists of two parts: User Feedback and Performance Monitoring. 
Since we focus on the reputation algorithm implementation and evaluation, the collection of 
network data, for example users’ voting and monitoring data, is not in the scope of this 
implementation. The data used in this section is simulated according to the requirements of 
the algorithm. 
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We included the properties of user’s reputation and punishment rate into an object of Client, 
and owner information and access requirements into an object of DataFile. Fig.12 and Fig.13 
show the structure of the two objects.  
 
Figure 12 Client object structure 
In Fig.12, the Client object contains its user id, reputation level, and punishment rate as 
public variable. Additionally, userFeedback() is designed to give feedback to other users in 
the system, while performanceMonitoring() stores its network performance data. 
reputationLevel() and renewClientRep() is designed to evaluate and update user’s reputation. 
In Fig.13, the DataFile object contains the file information and its access policy specified by 
the data owner. RC can retrieve the file information and access policy after receiving a 
request, and verify if the requester is eligible. 
 
Figure 13 DataFile object structure 
- 47 - 
 
The algorithm is implemented according to the equations introduced in Chapter 3. Table VI 
lists the values defined for some parameters and variables in the equations. 
Table VI Parameter values and variable range 
Param/Variable Value/Range 
  1.0 
  100.0 
monitoring data range[0, 1] 
voting range[0, 1] 
t Function: time() 
   Function: time() 
punishment rate 1/reputationLevel 
Individual TL assessment algorithm 
The Individual TL algorithm is implemented according to the formula introduced in Chapter 
3. The value defined for the parameters are listed in Table VII. 
4.2.4 Implementation of secure communication  
After the implementation of the main function blocks, we enabled the communication 
between each entity in the system by applying client/server mode according to the role of 
different entities. In order to secure the communication, we applied SSL protocol for the 
communication, and use OpenSSL (http://www.openssl.org/) for the implementation of SSL-
based communication. 
Library overview 
OpenSSL is an open source library written in C. It provides the implementation of SSL and 
TLS protocols, as well as some basic cryptographic algorithms and various utility functions. 
Popular symmetric ciphers such as DES, and public key cryptography such as RSA are 
available in the crypto-OpenSSL library. Besides, it enables the implementation of digital 
certificates and authentication functions. Generally, OpenSSL can be either used as 
- 48 - 
 
command tool, or library included in the program. Command tool is normally used when 
generating cryptographic keys, or performing digital signature and authentication. In our 
implementation, we used OpenSSL command line tool for certificate generation, and used 
OpenSSL as a library in order to utilize its cryptographic APIs and utility functions. 
Table VII Parameter values 
Param/Variable Value/Range 
  100.0 
  0.5 
   0.5 
   0.3 
   0.2 
       /        100 
       /        50 
                30 
pl (priority) 
TL*                                                  
                          
 
pu(punishment  
rate) 
1/TL 
Prepare private key and certificates: 
SSL-based connection is secured by identity verification and data encryption. To start a SSL-
based communication, it is necessary to verify each entity’s certificates to assure the identity 
of the other communicator. In our implementation, we used OpenSSL command line tool to 
generate a self-signed certificate, since it is only for test usage. Because certificates are 
related to public key cryptography, we firstly generated a private key in order to create and 
sign a certificate. OpenSSL provides the function and command to generate a RSA-based 
private key. 
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By the first command, a RSA-based private key is generated and written in privkey.pem file. 
The second command is used to create a self-signed certificate using the generated private 
key. X.509 is a standard format for public key certificates, and all the key/certificate files are 
created in .pem format. 
Setup SSL connection: 
SSL connection is setup by firstly initiating the OpenSSL library and packages. In the 
following functions, SSL_library_init() is invoked to initiate the library, and 
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() is invoked to load all the algorithms in the library in order to 
use its APIs in the latter program. ERR_load_crypto_strings() and ERR_load_SSL_strings() 
are the functions for loading error handling packages of libraries for crypto and ssl. 
 
 
 
 
 
Establish SSL connection: 
By finishing loading all the required libraries and packages, we started to set up SSL 
connections by invoking the following functions. Function SSL_CTX_new(const 
SSL_METHOD *method) creates a SSL_CTX object to establish a SSL enabled connection, 
and defines if the SSL object is in the client mode or the server mode, by selecting 
SSL_METHOD. OpenSSL provides various options for SSL_METHOD, among which we 
choose SSLv23_client_method for client and SSLv23_server_method for server. SSLv23 
indicates our connection is compliant to both SSL protocol version2 and version3. 
$  openssl  genrsa  -out  privkey.pem 
$  openssl   req   -new   -x509   -key   privkey.pem   -out   cacert.pem   -days 
1095 
 
SSL_library_init(); 
ERR_load_crypto_strings(); 
ERR_load_SSL_strings(); 
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); 
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SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations specifies the location of CAfile, which is a library for 
storing trusted CA certificates, in order to verify if a server’s certificate is valid. The 
certificate matching is based on the subject name, key identifier and the serial number. For 
I/O operation setup and implementation, we used BIO, which is an I/O abstraction object 
defined in OpenSSL to simplify I/O operations in an application by encapsulating many I/O 
details in BIO functions. A BIO can handle SSL connections, unencrypted connections and 
file I/O. Function BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX) and BIO_get_ssl(BIO, SSL*) are called 
to initiate a SSL BIO for secure connection and data transmission. SSL_set_mode(SSL*, 
SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) is called to set the SSL connection in 
SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY mode. The flag SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY implies that the 
SSL connection never bothers the application with retransmission requests if the transport is 
blocking. It will cause the read/write operations to only return after the handshake and 
successful completion. Function BIO_set_conn_hostname(BIO, host_port) sets the host and 
its port number during the SSL connection. On the server side, it creates a BIO chain to add 
up new accepted connection requests, and free them by invoking BIO_pop(BIO) and 
BIO_free_all(BIO) after establishing the connections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By finishing setting up the SSL mode, verification list, and assigning connection host and 
port, we started a SSL handshake in order to finally establish a SSL connection. In terms of 
the client side, it firstly starts a connection request by calling BIO_do_connect(BIO) on the 
supplied BIO. Then it invokes BIO_do_handshake(BIO) to complete the SSL handshake and 
establish the SSL connection. On the server side, it firstly sets a BIO chain, at which the new 
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method); 
SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char 
*CApath) 
sbio = BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX); 
BIO_get_ssl(BIO, SSL*)  
SSL_set_mode(SSL*, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);  
BIO_set_conn_hostname(BIO, host_port); 
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accepted BIO can be attached to. Function BIO_do_accept(BIO) will be invoked twice, 
where the first time is for creating an accept socket and binding an address, while the second 
time is used to wait for  incoming request or data transmission. After successful SSL 
connection, BIO_read(BIO, char*, int) and BIO_write(BIO, char*, int) handles the data 
transmission between client and server. BIO_free(BIO) is invoked to free all the initiated 
BIO objects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data packet design: 
In order to transmit and receive encrypted data/key file correctly and more efficiently, we 
design the packet format to clarify the basic information of the transmitted data. Fig.14 
presents the packet format, which consists of the header and data section. The header section 
contains file name, file length, and owner/user ID. File name and file length are set for 
correctly and efficiently reading data, while owner/user ID is set to recognize the file 
information. 
 
Figure 14 Packet format 
 
 
 
/* Client side */ 
BIO_do_connect(BIO) 
BIO_do_handshake(BIO) 
/* Server side*/ 
BIO_set_accept_bios(BIO, BIO) 
BIO_do_accept(BIO) 
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Chapter 5    Performance Evaluation 
In this chapter, we conducted a number of tests in order to evaluate the performance of the 
three schemes. We first introduce the test environment including our workstation, encryption 
key size, and constant values set for system parameters. Next, we provide performance 
analysis in terms of the computation complexity, data confidentiality, flexibility and key 
management. Then we present the test cases and test results of the three schemes. Finally, we 
compare the performance of the three schemes and discuss their usage scenarios. 
5.1 Test environment introduction 
We implemented and tested the proposed schemes on a workstation with Intel Xeon CPU 
E31235 and 2-GB RAM, running Ubuntu 12.04 on Oracle VirtualBox. The communication 
between each entity is based on client/server mode on localhost, and it is secured over SSL 
protocol by applying OpenSSL library. We applied Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as 
the symmetric encryption method. For pairing and elliptic curve based cryptography, we 
applied Type A pairing because it has the fastest pairing time [79]. The order of the group   
is defined to be 160 bits, and the size of the prime field is defined to be 512 bits. As the size 
of the prime field is defined, the size of the public key is determined as two times of the field 
size plus 1 bit. 
5.2 Performance analysis 
In this section, we provide the performance analysis for the three data access control 
schemes in cloud computing, in terms of four indicators which are: Computational 
Complexity, Data Confidentiality, Flexibility, and Scalability.  
5.2.1 Computational complexity 
Computational complexity is a key indicator of scheme efficiency, and it is an essential 
factor for applying an access control scheme in practical systems. We evaluate the scheme 
performance by analyzing their computational complexity of each main operation. Table 
VIII presents the computational complexity of the three schemes and HASBE scheme 
proposed in [14]. 
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Table VIII Computational complexity 
Operation Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 HASBE[14] 
System Setup                     
User Initiation                        
Individual TL PK Generation N/A             N/A 
Individual TL SK Generation N/A           N/A 
Re-encryption Key Generation      N/A      N/A 
Encryption                             
Decryption                           
Re-encryption      N/A      N/A 
Reputation Evaluation      N/A      N/A 
Individual TL Assessment N/A           N/A 
Notes:  
Scheme1: Reputation and PRE based data access control; 
Scheme2: Individual TL and CP-ABE based data access control; 
Scheme3: Heterogeneous data access control; 
n: the number of authorized users for data access;  
m: the number of votes;   
I: the maximum number of Individual TLs;  
w: the number of TLs specified in the access policy,      ,     is the maximum numbers of Trust levels; 
Y: the number of leaf nodes in an access policy tree; 
S: the attribute set; 
M: the number of attributes in S; 
X: translating nodes of access policy tree; 
j: the number of divided key segments 
As shown in the table, our schemes are more efficient than HASBE in terms of System Setup 
and User Initiation, because we constrain the number of attributes and supplement the 
security level by providing reputation, Individual TL, and the punishment mechanism. 
Moreover, there are no pairing operations for Encryption in our schemes, thus it makes the 
computation faster. For Encryption and Decryption, Scheme 1 is the most computationally 
efficient since the algorithm are not affected by any variables. The computational complexity 
of Scheme 2, Scheme 3, and HASBE depend on the number of attributes specified in the 
access policy tree. Scheme 2 and HASBE have the same computational cost if they have the 
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same number of attributes. Besides the number of attributes, the computational cost of 
Scheme 3 also depends on the number of symmetric key segments divided by the data owner. 
The computation of reputation evaluation and TL assessment is quite efficient, since there 
are neither exponentiations nor pairing operations. 
When considering the computational efficiency for each entity in the system, data owners 
tend to be most lightweight. They require better user experience and are limited by device 
capability, while service providers (e.g., CSP, RC, etc.) are believed to own adequate system 
capability. Table VIII shows that Scheme 1 is most computationally efficient for data owners, 
while the others provide more fine-grained data access and do not require full trust in CSPs. 
5.2.2 Data confidentiality 
The data confidentiality of the three schemes is evaluated through three factors: 
cryptographic security, collusion, and punishment mechanism. Cryptographic security is the 
basic security requirement, since all the schemes are based on cryptographic algorithms. 
Collusion and punishment mechanism are related to the scheme design in order to encourage 
better performance and improve system security level. 
Cryptographic security 
The cryptographic security depends on the arithmetic security of the symmetric encryption 
algorithm, PRE and CP-ABE. For the symmetric encryption algorithm, we applied AES 
whose key size is beyond 128bit. It is widely used in multiple cryptographic systems, and is 
believed to be secure for data encryption. The standard security and master key security of 
PRE are proved in [77] under the assumption of extended Decisional Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (eDBDH). Additionally, PRE enables non-transitive property to prevent the re-
delegation of the decryption rights from, for example, rk_RC->A and rk_A->B to produce 
rk_RC->B. The arithmetic security of CP-ABE is proved in [12] under the assumption of 
Decisional BDH (DBDH). 
Collusion 
The problem of collusion is mainly concerned about the collusion of CSPs and all users in a 
system, because the RCs and other user authorities are fully trusted under the system model 
assumptions. CSPs are assumed to be semi-trusted not to disclose users’ data, and the 
plaintext is hidden from the CSPs through symmetric data encryption. Although CSPs do not 
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disclose stored data nor try to crack to obtain the plaintext, it is possible to collude with users 
to allow unauthorized access or extension of access right.  
For first scheme that depends on reputation and PRE, the problem of collusion between CSP 
and users is controlled by hiding the plaintext and any secret keys from the CSPs. The only 
encryption key a CSP has is a re-encryption key for an eligible user. Even though CSP 
colludes with the user who has been delegated the decryption rights, they can only recover 
the weak secret    , instead of the secret key of RC. However, since the AES key file is 
encrypted under the RC’s public key and the re-encryption key will not change if the RC and 
the user’s public key pairs remain unchanged, the collusion of CSP and user can break the 
property of fine-grained data access because the user with decryption right can access all the 
data from the same data owner. And the CSP can allow the extension of access right even if 
the data owner informs it to block a specific user. 
The second and third scheme that are based on CP-ABE provides higher security by hiding 
either encryption/decryption operations or secret keys from the CSPs. The access 
authorization and secret key generation are both controlled by the data owner itself. 
Moreover, a data owner can re-encrypt the data by modifying the policy tree integrated in the 
data encryption, instead of updating all public key pairs to manage the collusions, thus 
reducing the complexity of key management. The third scheme further improves the data 
confidentiality by dividing the symmetric key into multiple segments, so that a data requester 
has to recombine all the key segments for decryption. However, the two schemes do not 
completely eradicate the problem of extending users’ access right, since the user revocation 
is based on the blocking list controlled by CSPs who are semi-trusted. 
Punishment mechanism 
Punishment Mechanism is applied in the Scheme 1 and Scheme 3 to supplement the data 
confidentiality. It can reduce the possibility of security problems such as collusion, by 
monitoring performance and reputation, and carrying out several punishment actions. Driven 
by the business and profits, CSPs are encouraged to have better performance and dedicate to 
provide more secure data storage. 
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5.2.3 Flexibility 
The scheme flexibility is evaluated in terms of User Flexibility, which relates to actions or 
online flexibility of users when dealing with access requests and delegations. 
User Flexibility relates to complex operations and online requirements when dealing with 
data access requests, especially for data owners, because service users expect excellent user 
experience and less operational complexity. The data owners in the first scheme that depends 
on PRE and reputation are most flexible, since they do not need staying online to handle the 
re-encryption and access right authorization. On the contrary, the second scheme requires 
data owners to handle Individual TL assessment and TL secret key issuing when there is an 
access request. This mechanism increases the work load of the data owners, but provides 
higher security level and looses the requirement of trust towards CSPs. Although the third 
scheme retains the most encryption keys, it provides flexibility for users to balance between 
operational complexity and security level. The data owners can choose any of the provided 
mechanisms, and decide whether they are willing to stay online and fully control the access 
right delegation. This heterogeneous property enables free options to choose an access 
control mechanism mostly according to their own demands. 
5.2.4 Scalability 
The essential factors that affect system scalability are key management and user revocation. 
Table IX lists the number of keys issued or managed by each entity in different schemes. 
As shown in the table, scheme 1 that is based on PRE and reputation has the least number of 
keys that need to be managed. All the entities in the system are responsible to generate and 
manage their own public key pairs, and the re-encryption algorithm only requires RC’s secret 
key and user’s public key. The data owner does not have to handle re-encryption no matter 
how many access rights it needs to delegate. The public keys in Scheme 2 include the system 
public key, user’s public key and TL public key. The secret keys in Scheme 2 include user’s 
secret key and TL secret key that is issued to an authorized data requester. The reason why 
scheme 3 has the maximum number of keys is that it enables both PRE and CP-ABE based 
encryption algorithms, in order to provide flexible access control mechanisms and higher 
security level. HASBE [14] grants all the key issuing and management to domain authorities 
that makes the domain authorities the bottleneck of system performance in terms of 
scalability. 
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One improvement of the three schemes for reducing key management load is applying 
reputation and Individual TL evaluation, as well as blacklist for user revocation. This 
improvement supplements the security level of data confidentiality while decreases the 
computational cost compared to cryptographic methods. And it monitors all entities’ 
performance and encourages better performances. 
Table IX Number of keys owned by different entities 
 Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 HASBE [14] 
Data 
Owner 
1PK;1SK; 
1 Symmetric key 
3PK;2SK; 
1 Master Key; 
1 Symmetric key 
4PK; 3SK; 
1 Master Key; 
1 Symmetric key 
1PK; 1SK;  
1 Master Key; 
1 Symmetric key 
User 
1PK;1SK;  
1 Symmetric key 
2PK;2SK; 
1 Master Key; 
1 Symmetric key 
3PK;3SK; 
1 Master Key; 
1 Symmetric key 
1SK;  
1 Symmetric key 
RC 
1PK;1SK; 
N*Re-encryption 
key 
N/A 
1PK;1SK; 
N*Re-encryption 
key 
N/A 
CSP N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Trust 
Authority 
N/A N/A N/A 
1PK; n*Master 
Key; m*SK 
Notes:  
Scheme1: Reputation and PRE based data access control; 
Scheme2: Individual TL and CP-ABE based data access control; 
Scheme3: Heterogeneous data access control; 
N: number of authorized user 
n: number of sub-domain authorities 
m: number of users in the domain 
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5.3 Performance Test 
In this section, we present the results and analysis of the performance test for the three 
schemes. 
5.3.1 Performance test of Scheme 1 
The performance test for Scheme 1 is based on the function blocks of PRE and Reputation 
Model implemented in Chapter 4. We evaluate the scheme by analyzing the operations 
conducted by different entities: Data Owner, User, CSP, RC, and test their performance for 
each operation. Table X lists the main operations and computation efforts managed by 
different entities in the system. 
The Data Owner is only responsible for its public key pair generation and encryption 
including AES and PRE encryption. The computational cost for AES depends on the size of 
the underlying data, and it is inevitable in any cryptographic method. The PRE encryption 
requires 2 exponentiations, and the key generation requires 1 pairing and 1 exponentiation. 
The computation for a data owner is quite lightweight since it does not need to handle re-
encryption or key management no matter how many authorizations of data access right need 
to be issued. The User who requests to access data in the CSP only needs to decrypt data and 
key file using its own secret key, no matter which owner the encryption key comes from. 
The CSP in this scheme is responsible for data re-encryption and user revocation. For data 
re-encryption, it takes 1 pairing, and the computational effort is linear to the number of users 
who are authorized to access data. User revocation does not require any computational effort. 
Instead, it does the database lookup and blocks the user’s access right according to the data 
owner’s demand. 
The RC is a trusted third-party responsible for checking data’s access policy and a user’s 
reputation level, in order to determine if the user has the right to access the required data. If it 
is the case, the RC then issues the re-encryption key to the CSP using the authorized user’s 
public key. The computational effort consists of two parts: re-encryption key generation and 
reputation evaluation. Re-encryption key generation requires 1 exponentiation for every 
request, so that the computation is linear to the number of users who request data access at 
any time point. Reputation evaluation depends on the number of users who request for data 
access, and the number of the other entities that provide votes. 
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Table X Operation and computations in Scheme 1 
Role Operations Computations 
Data Owner 
Public Key pair Generation 1Pairing + 1Exp 
Encryption 2Exp 
User 
Public Key pair Generation 1Pairing + 1Exp 
Decryption 1Exp 
CSP Re-encryption n Pairing 
RC 
Public Key pair Generation 1Pairing + 1Exp 
Re-encryption Key Generation nExp 
Reputation Generation (mMult + mExp)K 
Notes:  
Exp: Exponentiation;  
Pairing: Bilinear Pairing;   
Mult: Multiplication;   
n: Number of authorized users for data access;  
m: Number of votes;   
K: the total number of users who request data access;  
Fig.15 presents the execution time of each operation conducted by different entity, in the 
cases of 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit sized AES keys. The reputation evaluation contains 
10000 user votes. As shown in Fig.15, the algorithm of PRE encryption, decryption and 
Delegation (re-encrypt key generation) consumes less computational power, because they do 
not contain pairing operations. We can observe that the Re-encryption handled by CSP is the 
most time consuming process because it contains pairing operations, which are the most 
expensive computations in the PRE algorithm. Additionally, the execution time of PRE 
algorithm over AES symmetric key does not differ much with the tested three-sized AES 
keys. This fact could greatly benefits data owners to choose a long symmetric key to ensure 
high level of data security.  The execution time of Delegation, which herein refers to the 
operation of issuing re-encryption key rkRC->u to the authorized user, also remains the same 
with different sized AES keys, since it only operates on the private key of RC and the public 
key of the user. The reputation evaluation time is not influenced by AES key size. 
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    Figure 15 Execution time of scheme operations             Figure 16 Time comparison of rk_RC->u and NON 
                                                                                                         rk_RC->u key generation for old users 
One improvement we have in our scheme for PRE is to skip the re-encryption key generation 
process at RC, if the key of the user has been already generated before and the user’s 
information remains unchanged. Fig.16 shows the request processing time at RC, including 
data policy checking reputation evaluation and re-encryption key generation, in two cases. In 
the first case, the RC generates a re-encryption key for every request if the requester satisfies 
the policy and reputation level. In the second case, RC directly fetches the already generated 
re-encryption key from the granted user’s record. As shown in Fig.16, the higher the number 
of requests from the users who have the records at RC, the more efficiency improvement our 
scheme can achieve. In practice, the user could access cloud services multiple times. Thus, 
utilizing the existing re-encryption keys greatly helps the RC to improve its efficiency and 
capacity. 
We compare our scheme with the personal health records sharing scheme over cloud 
proposed in [80] based on ABE (combination of Multi-Authority ABE and Key-Policy ABE). 
Table XI presents the time comparison between our scheme and [80]. The encryption and 
decryption time (containing 50 attributes) in [80] is 264ms and 25ms respectively, which is 
much longer than that in our scheme. Although the experiment workstations are different, the 
apparent time differences can still indicate that our scheme is more efficient. In addition, 
sophisticated key management and user revocation are replaced by various access policies 
regarding user reputation, which has much less time consuming computations. 
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Table XI Operation time comparison with scheme in [80] 
Time 
Our Scheme 
(tested on a workstation 
with 3.2 GHz processor, 
256-bit AES key and 512-
bit prime field) 
Records Sharing scheme 
in [80] (tested on a 
workstation with 3.4 GHz 
processor, 256-bit AES 
key and 512-bit prime 
field) 
Key Encryption 4.2ms 264ms 
Key Decryption 2.1ms 25ms 
User Revocation 
Included in Reputation and 
Data policy checking 
32ms 
Re-Encryption 11.7ms N.A 
Reputation Evaluation 22.7ms (for 10000 votes) N.A 
total sum of operations 40.7ms 321ms 
5.3.2 Performance test of Scheme 2 
We evaluate the scheme by analyzing the operations conducted by different entities: Data 
Owner, User, CSP, and test their performance for each operation. Table XII lists the main 
operations and computation efforts managed by different entities in the system. 
The system setup, including Master Key (MK) and system Public Key (PK) generation, can 
be conducted in User Agent, or other trusted authorities in the system. The MK and PK are 
global parameters that are shared between users to initiate their own public key pairs. And 
they do not change with either the number of users in the system, or the specified maximum 
Individual TLs for access policy. 
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Table XII Operation and computations 
Role Operations Computations 
User Agent 
Master Key Generation 1Exp 
System Public Key Generation 1Pairing 
Data Owner 
CSP Reputation Evaluation (mMult + mExp)K 
Public Key pair Generation 2Exp 
Individual TL Public Key Generation I*2Exp 
Issue TL Secret Key 1Exp 
Encryption w*3Exp 
Trust Assessment K*4Exp 
User 
CSP Reputation Evaluation (mMult + mExp)K 
Public Key pair Generation 2Exp 
Decryption 2Pairing 
CSP Checking user ID validity and blacklist User Data Search 
Notes:  
Exp: Exponentiation;  
Pair: Bilinear Pairing;   
w: the number of TLs specified in the access policy,      ,     is the maximum number of Trust levels; 
I: the maximum number of Individual TLs; 
m: Number of votes;   
K: the total number of users who request data access;  
In this scheme, either Data Owner or User who requests for data service can firstly evaluate 
the CSP’s reputation through the Reputation Evaluation Model, in order to ensure if the CSP 
is trustworthy enough to provide data storage service. Data Owner is responsible for 
encryption, verifying requester’s eligibility through individual trust assessment, and issuing a 
TL based secret key. Encryption consists of data encryption through AES, and CP-ABE 
encryption. The computational cost for AES encryption depends on the size of the 
underlying data, and it is inevitable in any cryptographic method. For CP-ABE encryption, 
the data owner firstly generates the TL public key PK_TL, which covers each of the TLs 
specified in the system. The computational cost for generating PK_TL is I*2Exp, in which I 
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is the maximum number of TL. Next, the data owner encrypts the AES key using PK_TL, 
according to the required TL specified in the access policy. The computational cost is 
w*3Exp, in which w is the number of TLs enabled in the access policy. For verifying a 
requester’s access right, the data owner evaluates the requester’s individual TL through the 
Trust Assessment Model, which contains 4 exponentiations for each evaluation. The TL 
secret key SK_TL is issued by the data owner, and implies the requester’s individual TL. The 
user who requests for data can use the issued SK_TL to decrypt the AES key file. The CP-
ABE Decryption algorithm contains two pairing operations no matter how complex the 
access policy is, because the algorithm will conduct the decryption algorithm only if the TL 
in SK_TL meets one of the TL attributes in the access policy. 
CSP is computationally lightweight since it does not need to carry any data encryption or key 
issuing. Besides of the data storage, the CSP is responsible for checking all users’ identities 
and user revocation by searching through the blacklist. 
 
Figure 17 Execution time of operations in Scheme 2 
In the performance test, we specify the Individual TLs as attributes and divide them into 5 
levels (     ). Fig.17 presents the execution time of Setup, User Initiation including user’s 
public key pair generation, Individual TL public key and secret key generation, Decryption, 
Trust Assessment and CSP’s reputation evaluation. As introduced in Table XII, the required 
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TLs in access policy have no impact on the performance of the above operations presented in 
Fig.17. Since we specify the maximum TL in the system, the TL public key PK_TL 
generation takes about 17ms, and issuing TL secret key SK_TL is less than 5ms. In various 
applications, PK_TL generation process can be different depending on the number of 
specified levels, as shown in Fig.18. The execution time of SK_TL generation stays constant 
and it is about 3ms, which implies that the SK_TL issuing process should be very efficient. 
Moreover, the decryption time is about 7ms. Trust Assessment is conducted by the data 
owner, and it costs around 3ms to evaluate the TLs for 10000 users. The reputation 
evaluation towards CSP contains 100000 votes and took about 10ms, which is reasonable for 
the system performance. 
              
     Figure 18 Execution time of PK_TL and SK_TL                          Figure 19 Execution time of encryption   
               with different maximum TL levels                                                  with different required TL 
Fig.19 shows the performance of Encryption algorithm with different required TLs. It 
illustrates that the higher the required trust level, the less time the Encryption spends, 
because there are less authorized access conditions to be enabled. 
5.3.3 Performance test of Scheme 3 
Scheme 3 provides a flexible way for the data owner to choose either PRE/Reputation based 
or CP-ABE/TL based data access control mechanism. In the performance evaluation, we 
firstly provide four mechanisms for users to choose from. Next, we test the performance of 
each operation in both PRE/Reputation based and CP-ABE/TL based access control. Table 
XIII presents the four mechanisms that are enabled in the scheme. 
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Table XIII Mechanisms for heterogeneous data access control 
 Access Control Method Key Division 
Mechanism 1 Only PRE and Reputation Evaluation 
   =  ;    =   ; …… 
   =   ;     = null 
(  +  +…  =size of K; n is 
the number of RCs) 
Mechanism 2 
Only CP-ABE and Individual TL 
Assessment 
  = null;    = K 
Mechanism 3 Both PRE-Reputation and CP-ABE-TL 
   =   ;    =   ; …… 
   =   ;     =m 
(  +  +…  +m=size of K; n 
is the number of RCs) 
Mechanism 4 Either PRE-Reputation or CP-ABE-TL 
   =   ;    =   ; …… 
   =   ;      = K 
(  +  +…  =size of K; n is 
the number of RCs) 
Notes:  
K: the size of AES key;  
  : nth key segment for PRE and Reputation based access control 
    : key segment for CP-ABE and TL based access control 
In our performance test, we employed one RC for reputation management, and proved that 
the performance is negligibly affected by the number of RCs. As shown in Table XIII, 
Mechanism 1 and Mechanism 2 enable only one of the two access control methods which are 
reputation based or Individual TL based method. Therefore, data owner does not need to 
divide the AES key. In Mechanism 3, the AES key is divided into two segments K0 and K1, 
in order to enable both access control methods for dual data protection. Mechanism 4 
provides an option to use either of the two access control methods, so that a data requester 
can get either K0 or K1 to decrypt the data. Fig.20 shows the packet format of encrypted key 
file. The sequence number indicates the position of the key segment, in order to correctly 
recombine K0 and K1. 
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Figure 20 Packet format 
Fig.21 shows the execution time of CP-ABE setup, CP-ABE key pair generation, PRE key 
pair setup and generation, TL public/secret key generation, and Re-encryption key 
generation. The performance of the operations is not affected by either the user’s preference 
of key division or the required individual Trust Level. In the performance test, we assumed 5 
trust levels, and the TL public key generation process can vary with different number of 
maximum trust levels, as shown in Fig.18. 
 
Figure 21 Execution time of operations in Scheme 3 
Fig.22 shows the execution time of reputation evaluation and policy checking which is 
conducted in RC, and trust assessment that is processed by the data owner. The performance 
of reputation evaluation depends on the number of votes received by RC, and the execution 
time of Individual TLs depends on the number of access requests received by the data owner. 
The computational cost for trust assessment is quite low, which reduces the computation load 
of data owner. 
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Figure 22 Execution time of trust assessment, reputation evaluation and policy check,  
For the performance evaluation, we test three different sized AES keys: 128-bit, 192-bit and 
256-bit. Fig.23 illustrates that the AES key size has little effect on the performance of CP-
ABE encryption, as well as the decryption which takes around 6.50ms in the test, shown in 
Fig.24. For different required Individual TLs, the encryption time varies because different 
numbers of authorized levels are enabled in the access policy. The higher the required trust 
level is, the less time the encryption process spends.  
Fig.25 presents the performance of the PRE process. We can observe that the PRE operations 
are also not clearly affected by the size of (partial) AES key. This fact could benefit the data 
owners to choose a long symmetric key if they need high level of data security and the 
selection of access control mechanisms can depend on user’s requirements in terms of 
security and efficiency, instead of the size of key segment. We can also observe that the 
computational cost of CP-ABE is higher than that of PRE algorithm, because CP-ABE 
carries more exponentiation and pairing operations.  
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Figure 23 CP-ABE encryption time of AES keys 
 
Figure 24CP-ABE decryption time of AES keys 
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Figure 25 Execution time of PRE operations 
5.4 Performance comparison and user scenario discussion 
Upon the performance test and analysis in previous sections, we provide detailed 
comparisons between the three schemes in Table XIV, and discuss their suitable use 
scenarios. We can observe from Table XIV that all three schemes apply AES as symmetric 
cryptographic method for data encryption, and blacklist for user revocation to reduce the 
computational cost. Scheme 2 and Scheme 3 which apply CP-ABE as cryptographic 
algorithm have higher level of data confidentiality, because they require the data owners to 
issue the private key by themselves, instead of depending on the CSPs or the RCs.  
For Scheme 1, most of the computational cost is distributed in RC and CSP for re-encryption 
key generation and ciphertext re-encryption. This design frees data owners from heavy 
computations, and there is no online requirement for data owners to deal with access requests. 
PRE and reputation-based evaluation also increase the system scalability by simplifying key 
management, in which a user holds one key pair and only RC is responsible for managing 
the re-encryption keys. In terms of the system model, the RCs should be fully trusted in order 
to insure that the access rights can be delegated only to eligible users. However, it is difficult 
and risky to put full trust on one entity in a public cloud, which decreases the level of data 
confidentiality of Scheme 1, compared to the other two schemes. Scheme 1 is suitable for the 
private cloud environment, or data storage system inside an enterprise, because the 
infrastructure and authority is trusted in this case.   
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Table XIV Comparison table 
 Techniques 
Computation 
Distribution 
Data 
Confidentiality 
System 
Model 
Assumption 
User 
Revocatio
n 
Scalabili
ty 
Scheme 1 
AES, PRE, 
Reputation 
Evaluation 
Mostly in 
RC and CSP 
Average 
RC fully-
trusted, CSP 
semi-trusted 
Blacklist High 
Scheme 2 
AES, 
CP-ABE, 
Individual 
Trust 
Mostly in 
Data Owner 
High 
CSP semi-
trusted 
Blacklist High 
Scheme 3 
AES, PRE, 
CP-ABE, 
Reputation 
Evaluation, 
Individual 
Trust 
Mechanism 
Dependable 
High (specific 
security level 
can be chosen 
by data 
owner) 
RC fully-
trusted, CSP 
semi-trusted 
Blacklist Medium 
Scheme 2 has higher data confidentiality level, because it requires the data owners to assess 
the requesters’ trust levels and issue the ABE private keys by themselves. The CSPs are only 
responsible for user ID verification, and providing data services. There is no requirement for 
fully trusted entity for key or access right authorization, comparing to Scheme 1. Applying 
user blacklist can increase the system efficiency and scalability by simplifying the user 
revocation process, and reducing the operations for key updating and ciphertext re-
encryption. However, CP-ABE brings heavier computational load than PRE algorithm. And 
most computations, such as encryption and ABE key generation, are conducted by data 
owners, which can affect user experience.  Additionally, data owners are required to be 
online in order to process data requests and issue private keys to eligible users. Scheme 2 is 
suitable for the public cloud environment, since it enables higher confidentiality and security 
level. It can also be applied to applications for social networks. For example, in a 
professional social network, a user can decide which company is eligible to access his/her 
resume by evaluating the company’s individual trust level. 
Comparing to Scheme 1 and Scheme 2, Scheme 3 provides more options in terms of 
cryptographic algorithms used for data access control. It enables more flexibility for users to 
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choose a balance point between computational complexity and data confidentiality. Different 
from Scheme 1, there could be multiple RCs to evaluate a user’s reputation, and manage re-
encryption keys. This design improves the security level of PRE and reputation based data 
access control scheme, because a user needs to be authorized by all RCs to get a complete 
AES key for decryption. However, the flexibility of user’s option can lead to complexity of 
system operation and key management. It is difficult for a CSP to manage multiple AES key 
segments for a user, especially when there are a huge number of users in the cloud 
environment. Because Scheme 3 applies both PRE and CP-ABE algorithms, it requires key 
pairs for both cryptographic algorithms, which increases the total number of keys in the 
system and makes the key management more sophisticated. Scheme 3 can be deployed in a 
public cloud environment because of its high security level and flexibility. For example, it 
can be applied in a public health-care system, in which a patient can delegate the access right 
of the personal information to his/her doctors by choosing PRE and reputation based control 
mechanism. And the patient can choose CP-ABE and Individual TL based mechanism to 
issue the access right to other research organizations or third parties.  
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Chapter 6    Conclusions and Future Work 
In this chapter, we present the conclusions of this thesis, and propose several improvements 
for the future works. 
6.1 Conclusions 
To protect the data and privacy from disclosure, a number of schemes have been proposed 
for data access control in cloud computing. Before applying an access control scheme in a 
practical system, it is indispensable to evaluate its performance in various aspects, such as 
efficiency and flexibility. In this thesis, we addressed the implementation and evaluation of 
three schemes for data access control in cloud computing. We implemented the reputation 
and Individual TL assessment algorithms, and integrated them with the cryptographic 
algorithms such as PRE and CP-ABE to develop data access control schemes. Furthermore, 
we implemented the SSL-based communication to enable the secure data transmissions. 
Based on the implementations, we conducted a number of performance tests for the three 
schemes. We then presented the results of the performance evaluation, the analysis and 
comparison on several properties, such as data confidentiality, computational complexity, 
flexibility and key management. 
According to the performance evaluation, the computational efficiency is an important factor 
for designing a data access control scheme, especially when deploying the scheme in 
practical systems. Key management is a vital issue for cryptography based systems, 
especially for the system scalability. It can influence whether the enterprises are willing to 
adopt the access control scheme, because key management can sometimes very complicated 
and resource consuming. Reputation and individual trust can be an effective method to 
control data access in cloud computing, and also for choosing CSPs with better performances. 
It can be applied in combination with cryptographic algorithms, and help to reduce the 
computational cost. 
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6.2 Future work 
After the current implementation and performance evaluation, we realize that there can be 
more effort relating to system implementation, scheme evaluation, and further deployment 
into practical applications. The future work may include: 
Enrich the system implementation: The current implementation contains one data owner, 
one user, and one CSP to form a basic system that applies the data access control schemes. 
Therefore, we can extend the network scale that contains more users and CSPs, as well as 
more RCs to support multi-dimensional access authorization in a system. This improvement 
can make our implementation close to practical systems, and enables more comprehensive 
performance evaluation. 
Integrate and encapsulate the function blocks: We could further integrate and encapsulate 
the current function blocks to develop an effective tool box for future implementation and 
development. 
Provide real network data for reputation and Individual TL evaluation: The current 
implementation and evaluation is based on the already collected data, such as users’ voting 
and network monitoring results. In the future work, we can collect users’ data, and monitor 
user behavior in a real network in order to evaluate their real reputation and trust level. 
More comprehensive performance evaluation: Based on the above improvements for 
system implementation and data collection, we can provide more comprehensive evaluation 
towards the proposed access control schemes. For example, we can develop a test platform 
which can be more generally applied for implementation and evaluation of data access 
control schemes. This platform can contain a toolbox which consists of function blocks of 
some common cryptographic algorithms, such as PRE, CP-ABE. Moreover, it can be applied 
to monitor network flow to test communication cost, to simulate simultaneous requests to 
test system throughput and scheme efficiency, and other comprehensive performance 
evaluations.   
Deployment in practical systems: We can deploy the data access control schemes in 
practical systems or applications. Thus we could monitor the performance, and adjust the 
schemes to practical cases.  
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Business model and legal aspects: In order to deploy a data access control scheme in 
practical systems or applications, it is sometimes inevitable to develop a corresponding 
business model. The access control services enabled by the scheme need to be rational and 
feasible in the aspect of business. For legal issues, we firstly need to be clear about the rules 
or laws regarding to data or privacy protection in a specific use scenario before deploying the 
data access control scheme, in order not to violate any data or privacy regulations. 
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